











Title of Document: NATIONAL PARTISANSHIP AND STATE 
POLICY DIFFUSION: THE IMPACT OF 
POLARIZED PARTIES ON STATE POLICY 
DECISIONS 
  
 Joseph Preston Wantz, III, Doctor of Philosophy, 
2014 
  





This project is an examination of patterns of state policy adoption, and 
provides a new theory for policy diffusion research.   While traditional policy 
diffusion research focuses on geographic proximity as the main mechanism 
for policy adoption, I argue that states are more likely to rely on partisan 
proximity and adopt policy from partisan neighbors.  This is, primarily, a 
result of heightened polarization nationally.  In the absence of national 
policymaking, states will feel both more pressure to create more policy as well 
as leeway to enact more partisan policies. In order to test this theory, I look at 
three cases: same-sex marriage, right-to-work, and state lottery adoption.  I 
utilize interviews with state lawmakers and interest group staff as well as 
quantitative methods to show the relationship between partisanship and policy 
  
diffusion.  Overall, this work adds an important element to a vast and well-
established literature and provides a new way of understanding the policy 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Shortly after his election as governor in 2005, Mitch Daniels of Indiana signed 
Executive Order 05-14, which ended collective bargaining for public sector unions in 
the state.  He did this on his first day in office, and argued that collective bargaining 
for public employees hindered his ability to make important decisions, particularly in 
how he proposed to re-shape Indiana’s state government.  The order was intended as 
an austerity measure that would both limit government spending on union wages and 
pension plans as well as provide flexibility in hiring and firing public workers. 
Daniels argued that the rollback of collective bargaining rights for public sector 
workers was a necessary step in order to reign in state spending.  The order met with 
opposition from labor and progressive groups, who argued that it was an attack 
against organized labor. 
In 2011, Wisconsin and Ohio made similar attempts to curb collective 
bargaining for public sector unions, with each state passing legislation that largely 
emulated Daniels’ order.  In a statement following the passage of legislation in 
Wisconsin, a Daniels spokesperson argued, “The most powerful special interests in 
America today are the government unions…I think what Scott Walker is trying to do 
is in the public interest.  Other states are catching up to what Governor Daniels has 
already done, and we’re continuing to aim higher.”
1
  The last point, here, is the most 
interesting.  While it is not necessarily clear that Daniels’ executive order was 
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intended as a template for future action by other states, Daniels was quick to claim 
credit for having started a potentially national trend.   
Though the ban on collective bargaining was passed by the Republican state 
legislatures in both states, local and national protests erupted over what was perceived 
as a dramatic blow to longstanding workers’ rights.  Polls indicated that, both 
nationally and in Wisconsin and Ohio, the ban was perceived quite negatively, with 
61% of respondents in a national USA Today/Gallup poll opposing ending collective 
bargaining rights for public workers.
2
  The backlash was so intense that voters in 
Ohio voted to repeal the measure.  Even more dramatically, Wisconsin Governor 
Scott Walker, a major champion of the ban, faced a recall election as the result of his 
support for ending collective bargaining for public employees. 
While Ohio and Wisconsin followed the example set by Indiana, the results 
were quite different.  Perhaps this is the case because Wisconsin and Ohio pursued a 
legislative solution rather than using an executive order, or that Republicans in both 
states misread public opinion regarding workers’ rights in the public sector.  
Regardless, it is clear that both states in some way followed Indiana’s example.  The 
benefits to state government, in terms of economics, are compelling.  Ending 
collective bargaining certainly frees both state legislatures and governors to pursue an 
agenda without needing to take collectively bargained contracts into account.  
Additionally, states can cut costs by freeing themselves of larger salaries and more 
demanding pension plans that public sector union workers enjoy. 
Of course, reducing spending is a consideration for any government.  States 
have clear incentives to cut costs where they can, in order to provide the service that 






voters expect and demand.  Ending collective bargaining, however, was clearly a 
controversial policy choice.  While the policy may have the benefit of saving money 
and cutting through red tape, the policy resulted in massive backlash in both 
Wisconsin and Ohio.  Both states had spending reduction needs, but the question 
remains: Why would states pursue such controversial avenues for cutting spending?  
One could certainly make the argument that there are less polarizing ways to 
cut a state’s budget, ways that are less likely to be repealed by voters or force a recall 
election for the governor.  While this is never an easy or desirable task, states often 
need to make such choices.  There are many policy areas in which the desirable 
policy is (or at least can be) clear.  Cutting budgets, however, will always leave states 
in a difficult position.  No matter where a state legislature or governor chooses to 
make cuts, or to raise taxes, some constituency will feel aggrieved.  Ending collective 
bargaining for public sector workers, however, is certainly one of the more 
controversial and potentially politically deadly ways to go about cutting costs.  
Indeed, while Mitch Daniels was able to avoid political disaster, the same cannot be 
said for the Republican governors in Ohio and Wisconsin who attempted to follow in 
Daniels’ footsteps.   
Regardless of the political difficulties involved, Daniels’ solution to a budget 
crisis was an innovative one.  In terms of public policy scholarship, innovation in 
states is a vital process for the diffusion of those policies.  Policy diffusion can be 
thought of as a contagion; one state gets “sick” and “infects” other states.  Put in 
policy terms, a state creates a policy, the policy works, and other states adopt the 




indeed, Berry and Berry (2007) argue that most states seek shortcuts in policy-
making.  With finite resources and varying amounts of time that state legislatures are 
actually in session, it often makes little sense for states to invent new policy when 
effective policy already exists.  Additionally, states tend to compete with one another 
when policy innovations occur, so as not to be left behind.  A classic example of this 
is reforming welfare benefits, a structure that creates little incentive for states to have 
more comprehensive benefits than states in their region (Francis, 1998; Rom et al., 
1998; Figlio et al., 1999; Arsenault, 2000; Brueckner, 2000; Barrileaux et al., 2002; 
Volden, 2002; Berry et al., 2003).  Additionally, if one state has created innovative 
policy, there is little reason for others to re-invent the wheel when it comes to dealing 
with similar issues.  
Public policy is complex and lawmakers have to deal with multiple 
contentious issues at once.  If austerity measures are successfully adopted in a state, 
which by nature is politically difficult, a blueprint can be provided for other states 
looking to craft similar policy.  Politics play an important role when states attempt to 
cut their budgets, and this was played out in both Wisconsin and Ohio.  Each state 
passed bills limiting collective bargaining rights, and each faced ferocious challenges 
in the aftermath of the bills’ passage, both through repeal efforts and also attempted 
recall of the politicians responsible.  The primary reason for this, of course, is that the 
decision to end collective bargaining was seen as partisan.  Indiana, Wisconsin, and 
Ohio all had Republican governors try to roll back labor rights, long a bastion of 




It is this intersection of partisanship and policy diffusion that this analysis 
seeks to understand.  While the traditional conception of diffusion focuses on 
geography, I examine the impact of partisanship on state policy diffusion, focusing 
primarily on legislative policymaking.  The collective bargaining example in this 
chapter looks at executive decision making, as it was the overall inspiration for this 
analysis.  Traditional diffusion research, however, focuses primarily on legislative 
action, though executive policymaking and ballot initiatives/state referenda are 
important to the overall field of research as well.  Rather than understanding diffusion 
as only amongst geographic neighbors, I look at “partisan” neighbors.  While Utah 
and Alabama share few geographic similarities, they may be interested in similar 
policies because of shared partisanship.  Rather than looking to states in their own 
region, partisan considerations can also drive diffusion. 
Additionally, the overall political climate in America has changed.  National 
political parties have become increasingly polarized.  Figure 1.1 shows the levels of 
partisan polarization in Congress over time.  Specifically, it looks at the distance 
between the parties on the first NOMINATE dimension. We can see that the distance 
between the parties in both the House and Senate begins to grow dramatically in the 
1990’s and has risen even higher than what existed during Reconstruction.  The nadir 
of partisan polarization occurs after World War II, but there is a steady increase in the 













While partisan distance in the Senate has not reached the level of that in the 
House, it is still striking when compared to the even the Reagan years.  Figure 1.2 
illustrates this concept in a similar way.  We can see that the percentage of moderates 
in both chambers has cratered in the past twenty years.  Fewer than 15% of both 
Houses, as of 2013, are comprised of moderates.  This, in and of itself, does not 
necessarily equate to partisan gridlock, it does map well with the rising tide of 
polarization shown in Figure 1.1.  In fact, Figure 1.2 is even more striking, in that it 
shows how little room there likely is for compromise in Washington.  With so few 
moderates, and the parties moving further and further away in terms of policy 
preferences, it is no surprise that policymaking has become increasingly difficult at 


























Figure 1.2: Percentage of Moderates per Chamber, 1879-2013 
 
 
 Figure 1.3: House Polarization and Congressional Lawmaking 
 
Legislative productivity has also declined dramatically over time, at least in 










































































Congress  consistently passed 800-1000 laws.  During the 2000’s, however, national 
lawmaking has fallen off a cliff, with recent Congresses passing fewer than 400 
public laws.  Congress scholars are somewhat divided as to whether the total number 
of bills passed is the absolute best measure of productivity, but it is clear that 
Congress is passing far fewer laws than it once did.  One of the likely culprits for this 
lack of productivity is likely high levels of polarization.  Figure 1.3 shows the 




We can see a negative relationship between House chamber polarization and 
congressional lawmaking.  When House polarization is at its highest, congressional 
productivity plummeted.  Though significant legislation can still be passed during 
periods of intense polarization, overall policymaking takes a severe hit.  While there 
are many possible consequences of a lack of congressional policymaking, the impact 
on state legislation needs to be examined.  This analysis looks at this issue through 
the lens of diffusion, and argues that the polarization that has affected national 
government at an increasing rate has had an effect on state level polarization.  As a 
result, states are more likely to look to their partisan neighbors when attempting to 
adopt policies from other states.   
This study contributes to the literature on policy development and diffusion.  
While I believe that geography has an important role to play for many policies, the 
partisan component that this work considers builds on a burgeoning area of research 
that looks beyond traditional conceptions of policy diffusion to how partisan 
                                                 
3





considerations drive state policy choice (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Spill, et al. 2001; 
Grossback et al., 2004; Volden, 2006; Karch, 2007; Marsh and Sharman, 2009).  It 
also adds the dimension of national polarization and examines those effects on state 
policy adoption.  This analysis starts to take a larger view of policy diffusion, and 
even more broadly, the relationship between state and federal policymaking.   
This study’s main contribution is proving a causal mechanism for 
understanding how partisan policy diffuses amongst states.  Rising political 
polarization nationally has influenced state level polarization, which in turn helps 
facilitate partisan diffusion.  In a polarized era, parties have more defined policy 
positions, and states can use partisan cues in order to determine where they should 
look for new policies.  Partisan neighbors act similarly to geographic neighbors in 
terms of diffusion, because similarly partisan states have similar political 
considerations.  If a Republican state finds an effective, “Republican” solution to a 
public policy issue, Republican neighbors may consider adopting the policy as well.   
 
Study overview 
 This analysis takes a case study approach to partisan policy diffusion.  
Specifically, it looks at the effect of partisan polarization on three policies: same-sex 
marriage, right to work, and state lottery adoption.  Geographic proximity is the 
traditional way in which scholars have looked at diffusion.  States share geographic 
and demographic similarities and therefore have incentives to adopt innovative 
policies created by their regional neighbors.  This, however, is not the case for all 




between the parties on a particular issue.  There are, of course, issues that have both 
geographic and partisan components.     
 It is important, here, to distinguish between partisanship and polarization.  
Though closely related, they are separate concepts that should not be thought of as 
interchangeable.  Partisanship is simply the party identification of a state legislature 
or a particular policy, like same-sex marriage.  A policy can be “partisan” if the 
parties have clear positions on the issue and if those positions are at odds.  The two 
policies examined in depth in this analysis, same-sex marriage and right to work, fit 
into this category.  Many policies can have some sort of partisan element, and this 
analysis begins to grapple with the implications of these elements for diffusion 
research. 
 Polarization, on the other hand, is a measure of the parties’ overall distance 
from each other.  For much of the analysis on national polarization, I look at 
NOMINATE scores for members of Congress to determine the overall level of 
polarization at the national level.  Polarization can lead to a reduction in policy 
creation, as we saw in Figure 1.3, and allows for partisans to more clearly identify 
one another in terms of policy positions.  During times of low polarization, the parties 
did not offer much of a choice to voters.  The Democratic Party dominated the South 
for decades, yet southern Democrats were, politically, far out of step with their 
northern, liberal co-partisans.  Knowing that a state was “Democratic” would not 
necessarily tell one much about the policy positions of that state.  During times of 
high polarization, however, this should change.  While, certainly, there will always be 




closer when polarization in general is high.  Indeed, I argue that national polarization 
influences state polarization primarily because it helps codify the distinctions between 
the parties.  Partisan diffusion, then, takes both of these concepts into account.  It 
measures whether the policy itself would appeal to one party or the other, and 
polarization can drive states to adopt policies that have also been adopted by their 
partisan neighbors. 
One of the ways I explain these concepts more thoroughly is through the use 
of qualitative interviews with state legislators and interest group staff to understand 
how those involved in the policy process perceive the role of partisan polarization in 
policy adoption.  The interviewees were involved in policy decisions in Maryland and 
Michigan, dealing with same-sex marriage (SSM) and right to work (RTW), 
respectively.  They were chosen for their particular roles in the debate, the uniqueness 
of their perspective, and to add detail to the case study information and quantitative 
results that I present. The interviews were semi open-ended, and relied on the 
interviewees describing their role in the policy debate, their opinions on how much 
state partisanship and/or geography affected passage of the policy, and whether they 
perceive national polarization as playing a role in state policy battles.  The interviews 
give insight into the ways that people on both sides of the policy debate understand 
the impact of policy diffusion on their issues, and I believe that their voices are 
important in our understanding of how partisan policy diffusion occurs.  I include a 





 Chapter 2 lays out my theory for partisan diffusion at the state level.  I review 
the existing literature on policy diffusion, and make the case that, while geographic 
diffusion still occurs, there is a need in the literature for a more thorough examination 
of how partisan polarization at the state level affects policy diffusion.  Additionally, I 
add a case study on state lottery adoption.  Lottery adoption is chosen because it has 
been a staple in diffusion literature, and is in many ways the prototypical geographic 
diffusion case. 
 Chapter 3 examines the case of same-sex marriage diffusion, both in terms of 
adoption SSM and banning the policy.  I regard SSM as a prototypical example of 
partisan policy diffusion, as the parties have distinct and opposing viewpoints on 
whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.  The policy has not diffused to 
only one area of the country, and the diffusion has broken down along partisan lines.  
The chapter also looks at Maryland’s adoption of the policy in depth, utilizing 
interviews to understand the context of policy debate as well as the strategy and 
tactics employed to pass the policy.  Finally, I look at SSM utilizing quantitative 
models and estimating the impact of state partisanship and national polarization on 
the adoption of the policy. 
 Chapter 4 follows a similar template by analyzing right to work legislation.  
RTW is a policy on which the parties disagree, but there is a geographic component 
as well.  The policy has an economic impact, and states that have adopted the policy 
can paint neighboring states as “bad for business,” thus putting pressure on those 
states to adopt RTW as well.  RTW is also a partisan issue, with the Republican Party 




the opposite for much of the policy’s history).  For the case study, Chapter 5 looks at 
Michigan’s stunning 2012 RTW adoption, following closely in Indiana’s footsteps.  
This adoption was stunning because of Michigan’s centrality in labor movement 
history, as well as in light of the fierce partisan battle that erupted in Indiana just 
months earlier.  I also estimate models that look at RTW diffusion from both a 
partisan perspective. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 reflects on the analysis presented and proposes new 
avenues of research in light of the changing circumstances for state policy diffusion.  
In particular, it poses two questions about the future of state policy diffusion research.  
If partisan polarization at the national level does have an effect on state policy 
creation, how wide ranging is that effect?  Certainly, continued systematic study of 
state policy diffusion from a partisan perspective must grapple with the changing 
partisan dynamics in America and what could be seen as congressional abdication of 






















Chapter 2: State Partisanship and Policy Diffusion 
 
How is public policy created?  This is about as broad a question as we can ask 
about government and politics.  Still, it is a vital question that has no easy answers, 
particularly since public policy itself is difficult to define.   As a result, the study of 
public policy has often been difficult for political scientists.  While the field is very 
adept in developing theories related to political institutions and behavior, both at the 
individual and the aggregate level, policy scholars have been somewhat less 
successful.  The biggest obstacle to creating adequate theories for explaining and 
predicting the dynamics of the policy process and outcomes that it produces is the 
inherent complexity of the policy process itself (Hofferbert, 1974; Van Meter and 
Van Horn, 1975; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Sabatier, 1986; Lester et al., 1987; 
Sabatier, 1991; Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Dowding, 1995; Dolowitz and Marsh, 
1996; Parsons, 1996; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996; Zahariadis, 2003; Sabatier, 
2007; Kingdon, 2010).   
The number of policy actors and governmental units involved, the time span 
for any given policy, and the lack of agreement over solutions to policy problems 
makes creating grand theories in public policy research difficult (Sabatier, 2007).   Of 
course, this does not mean that political scientists should not strive to create sound 
public policy theories.  On the contrary, political scientists must strive to develop 
predictive theories that can explain not only government processes but outputs as 




One of the most widely studied theories of public policy is that of policy 
innovation and diffusion.  The basic idea behind policy diffusion theory is that one 
state innovates and adopts a policy, and that innovation spreads to other states.  In 
particular, much of the policy diffusion literature focuses on geographic diffusion; 
neighboring states adopt policies as a result of regional economic competition, federal 
grant allocation, etc.  In particular, regional economic competition is a major impetus 
for geographic diffusion.  If bordering states have innovative economic policies, it 
puts pressure on other states in the reason to adopt them.  Not wanting to fall behind 
your neighbors is a key impetus in geographic diffusion research, as is simply 
adopting policy that has been proven to work elsewhere.   
Geographic diffusion has been a fruitful and important line of research, 
primarily because it analyzes and models a process that makes sense intuitively and 
has some basis in real world policy development.  It is important to note, however, 
that diffusion is a complex process that has many facets, with geography being just 
one (though, in certain cases, a vital one).   Karch (2007) makes this point clear, and 
argues that policy diffusion is a complex process that involves a host of factors, 
including state demographics, legislative professionalism, etc.  Much of this work 
focuses on the ways in which these disparate factors foster or inhibit geographic 
diffusion.   
This analysis focuses on partisanship at the state level as an important part of 
the story.  In particular, I focus on the role of the rise in partisan polarization on state-
level policy diffusion.  Polarization has risen dramatically in the past several decades, 




output.  The question, however, for this research is whether partisan polarization has 
affected state policy diffusion.  I argue that it has, and that shifting priorities for state 
policymaking have played a major role.  These shifts, primarily, come from increased 
state partisan polarization. 
State politics have become increasingly polarized, much like the national 
government (Barrileaux et al, 2002; Jenkins, 2006; Coffey, 2011, Enns and Koch, 
2013).   An important part of this study is understanding the ways in which those 
involved in the policy process understand and deal with rising partisanship and 
polarization in state government.  We can understand the policy diffusion process 
from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint by looking at it through the lens of those 
actually involved in policymaking can provide new and important insights.  This 
analysis relies on interviews from state legislators and interest group staff that have 
had a direct hand in recent (and controversial) policy decisions. 
In a state like Maryland, partisan polarization has become much more 
pronounced in recent years than in the past.  While Democratic politics dominate the 
state, there are many issues on which the parties disagree.  Kristin Jones, the Chief of 
Staff for Maryland’s Speaker of the House Michael Busch, sees partisanship as an 
issue in Maryland, though her position as an important player in Maryland’s power 
structure that is dominated by Democrats certainly has an influence on her view of 
partisanship in Annapolis: 
I think to a certain extent Maryland has become a more partisan place.  
Governor Ehrlich was our first Republican governor in 30 years and he came 
from Capitol Hill.  He came out of the Gingrich Contract with America.  For 
better or worse, depending on what side of this you stand on, I think that the 
dynamic became more partisan.  I don’t think we approach the partisanship 




collaboratively and our majorities are such that we can prevent gridlock...I 
think we benefit from a less partisan atmosphere. 
 
On the other side of the aisle, Republican state delegate Wade Kach sees the 
Democratic dominance of the Maryland legislature as enabling Washington-style 
partisan politics to take over the policy process in the state: 
I think that [partisanship] has [grown in Maryland].  I think it arrived here ten 
years ago and has grown steadily...The Democrats that have been elected in 
Annapolis are more and more liberal.  The Democrats being the majority party 
by 2:1...you’re expected, on the Democrat side, to vote the way the leadership 
wants you to unless you want to lose your subcommittee chairmanship or 
whatever leadership position you have.  So it’s in Maryland, it’s here, and 
each year it gets more and more intense.  It is not subsiding one bit. 
 
For both Democrats and Republicans, it is clear that partisanship is more of an 
issue in Maryland than ever before.  Democrats may feel that partisanship less than 
Republicans, but there is no doubt that politics in Annapolis has a particularly 
partisan flavor.   
Partisan polarization is a clear issue in state politics, much as it is at the 
federal level.  The question becomes, however, to what extent does partisan 
polarization affect state policy diffusion.  This chapter will begin to lay out a 
theoretical approach to this issue by focusing on fellow partisan states as “neighbors” 
in a similar fashion to geographic neighbors.  Rather than arguing that partisanship 
plays a small role in the “supporting cast” of factors that foster or inhibit geographic 
diffusion, I argue that in our polarized era, there is a new diffusion dynamic with 
state-level partisanship at its core. 
 This is primarily the case in an era of polarization, when party labels mean a 




stand for in terms of policy priorities, and thus are likely to look to their partisan 
neighbors for policy innovations.  There has been some recognition of partisan 
attachments affecting diffusion in the literature, but there needs to be a greater focus 
on grouping states as partisan neighbors as well as looking at groups of states as 
geographic units.  Partisan neighbors will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter, but the concept of a partisan neighbor are groups of states that share party 
control of state legislatures, and the extent of that control.  So, one could certainly say 
that a state controlled by the Republican Party is a neighbor to any other Republican 
state.  It would make more sense, however, to compare levels of control.  A 51/49 
party split in a state legislature will likely not yield the same partisan policies as a 
state with 60/40 control, nor will the first state look as frequently to the second state 
as it might with states that have similar levels of control.  In my case study chapters, I 
utilize both these variables. 
This study makes a unique contribution to the diffusion literature by 
examining the impact of national partisan polarization on state politics.  My theory is 
that rising polarization nationally has influenced state polarization, and thus 
facilitated partisan diffusion.  When states are highly polarized, and current research 
shows that this is largely the case, policies with a distinct partisan dimension should 
become more likely to diffuse amongst partisan neighbors,  This will be explored in 
greater detail later in this chapter, but it is important to introduce this idea here.  With 
state polarization on the rise, and with the parties themselves much more distinct in 
terms of policy positions than they had been in the past, national polarization is a 




an important part of Karch’s (2007) work, in that he evaluates the impact of 
federalism and devolution on state diffusion, but does not take national polarization 
into account.  This is an important piece of the diffusion story, and this analysis will 
explore its impact. 
National polarization may not have a direct impact on state policymaking, but 
the hardening of the parties’ positions on a host of issues have, I argue, filtered down 
to state politics.  As a result, policy diffusion scholars may need to take large-scale 
political trends into account when studying how state policy diffuses.  Though we 
would not necessarily expect partisan polarization to matter on every state issue, it 
should certainly matters on issues with a distinct partisan focus. 
 
Policy Diffusion and Innovation 
 While scholars and political observers can look simply at the end result of 
politics as policy, this does not give us a complete picture of how the process works.  
Though complicated, understanding the mechanisms for policy creation is as 
important as studying policy outputs. Context matters greatly in the study of public 
policy and looking at policy outputs without a sense of the process that created them 
is unsatisfying.  Any attempt to systematically understand policy outputs must 
incorporate an examination of how those outputs were created.   
The main question for this analysis is this: how much do partisan attachments 
and polarization, both at the state and national level, affect the diffusion of public 
policy from state to state?  The general diffusion model of public policy is one of the 




Eyestone, 1977; Foster, 1978; Welch and Thompson, 1980; Berry and Berry, 1990 
Mintrom, 1997; Mooney, 2001; Wejnert, 2002; Shipan and Volden 2006; Berry and 
Berry, 2007; Karch, 2007a; Karch, 2007b; Sabatier, 2007, Boushey, 2010; Shipan and 
Volden, 2012). In its most basic form, policy diffusion models look at the ways in 
which governments influence each other in the creation of new public policy.  Karch 
(2007b) succinctly defines the concept of policy diffusion when he notes: 
Diffusion occurs…when the likelihood that an innovation will be adopted in 
jurisdiction A is significantly affected by the existence of that innovation in 
jurisdiction B.  Diffusion does not occur when officials in multiple 
jurisdictions adopt the same innovation completely independently, nor does it 
occur when later adopters are unaware of the existence of the innovation 
elsewhere (p. 3). 
This underscores the core of the policy diffusion literature: there needs to be a 
conscious effort on behalf of states to adopt innovations that were created elsewhere.  
States simultaneously developing similar policies to respond to a problem is certainly 
an interesting phenomenon.  The innovation and diffusion model, however, provides 
a causal mechanism that can explain why states create similar policies over a period 
of time.  Berry and Berry (1990) show that the time bound nature of diffusion is key; 
the probability that a state will adopt an innovation created in another state is 
particularly interesting if it occurs within a particular period.  In general, however, 
much of the research on innovation and diffusion rests on regional foundations, 
meaning that states will adopt policies that are effective in neighboring states.   
So, for example, if Virginia creates a welfare-to-work policy that increases 
employment and lowers the state’s monetary commitment to an entitlement program, 
North Carolina, Maryland, and West Virginia may all seek to emulate the successful 




then conceivably by the national government as well (Schram, 1998).  Innovative 
state programs are often co-opted by other states, and most states seek shortcuts when 
attempting to create new policies (Eyestone, 1977; Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom and 
Vergari, 1998; Boehmke and Whitmer, 2004; Berry and Berry, 2007; Shipan and 
Volden, 2008).  That is, states look to avoid starting from scratch when they are 
creating policy and look to borrow from policies that have worked for other states. 
Again, however, it is important to note that geography is just one chapter in 
the overall diffusion story.  Indeed, Karch (2007) argues that there are political 
processes at work that facilitate policy diffusion, and he looks at diffusion primarily 
as a function of process.  Time constraints, legislative professionalization, and the 
overall information generation process that occurs when states create policies that 
then diffuse to other states.  This analysis, however, focuses on state partisanship as a 
key explanatory variable for diffusion.  It does not deny that geography, or the other 
policy processes that the diffusion literature has focused on, do not have an impact on 
state policy diffusion, or that partisanship is key for all policy diffusion.  Rather, I 
posit that when the parties have policy disagreements and there is an innovation in 
one of those policy areas, the diffusion of those policies should be strongly related to 
state partisanship. 
As Karch would note, however, the existence of innovations does not 
necessarily imply the existence of diffusion.  The causal mechanisms for diffusion are 
often unclear or complex.  Policymakers need to both understand that innovations 
have occurred and believe that those policies are effective or useful enough to be 




problems often need to be solved with limited amounts of time, energy, resources, 
and expertise (Lindblom, 1959).  In a perfect world, lawmakers would have all 
possible information and the time to use that information to craft productive policy 
that improves the lives of citizens.  Of course, Lindblom realized this.  The policy 
process is difficult to navigate and the outcomes are, at best, unclear.  The phrase 
“muddling through” is a good way to describe how policymakers need to operate: 
there are problems, the problems must be solved, we lack the ability, time, or funds to 
completely solve the problem, so we do what we can with the materials we have.   
This is the biggest reason that policy diffusion is an attractive way to create 
policy.  If an innovation exists elsewhere and others have put in the time and effort 
necessary to create it, why not borrow from them?  It makes a good deal of sense, 
given these constraints, for political actors to look toward the efforts of policy 
entrepreneurs that have already created innovative policy elsewhere.  There is little 
reason for states to “reinvent the wheel.”  While this is not necessarily the case for all 
policies or policy types, when there are highly technical policies or ones that do not 
necessarily have high public salience, it is likely preferable for state legislators (many 
of whom are part-time) to use templates provided by other states to solve policy 
issues.  Of course, policy borrowing can also be helpful on controversial or high 
profile policies, as states can see what has worked elsewhere and use that as part of an 
argument for adoption.  The process of policy diffusion relies upon innovations that 
are widely followed and, ultimately, copied to fit a particular set of needs in a given 




Though geography is not the only important variable for studying policy 
diffusion, it is certainly one that has generated a good deal of research, and for good 
reason.  States physically close to each other have incentives to adopt similar policies.  
Rather than creating a new solution to a policy problem shared by its neighbors, states 
can simply look to what those neighbors have done.  Geographically similar states 
may be forced to compete with one another as well.  If taxes are low on corporations 
in a particular state, their neighbors may feel pressure to lower corporate tax rates to 
compete.  I spoke with Indiana State Representative Jerry Torr, who sponsored 
Indiana’s right to work (RTW) law that was passed in 2012.  He made a clear 
economic argument for the state’s adoption of the policy. 
A study I relied on looked at the effect of manufacturing jobs 25, 50, 75 and 
100 miles out, each direction, from a border where on one side it was RTW 
and on the other it was not.  And the data spoke for itself.  Manufacturers, 
where it was close and they could choose either side, chose to operate in the 
RTW states.  With Indiana being the crossroads of America and not having a 
single border state that’s not RTW, I just thought the effects would be 
dramatically amplified. 
 
While the debate over the economic impact of RTW laws is not settled, clearly one of 
the main reasons for the policy’s adoption was an argument based on economic 
competitiveness.  For the supporters of RTW (a policy which will be explored in 
much more depth in Chapter 4), economics and geography are often touted as the 
most important benefits of RTW.  
States are often thought of as “laboratories of democracy”; taken quite 
literally, they have the ability to experiment.  With a smaller scale and less attention 
on a state legislature than Congress there is more opportunity for new policy to be 




be impossible for the larger and more intractable federal is more likely to occur at the 
state level.  (Volden, 2006; Karch, 2007).   Indeed, experimentation on innovative or 
controversial policies may not be feasible on the national level, as it has become 
increasingly difficult to get even non-controversial legislation enacted.  Innovation 
has long been at the center of diffusion scholarship, and for good reason.  Innovative 
state programs are often copied by other states; Berry and Berry (2007) argue that 
most states seek shortcuts in policy-making.  With finite resources and varying 
amounts of time that state legislatures are actually in session, it often makes little 
sense for states to invent new policy when effective policy already exists.   
States also tend to compete with one another when policy innovations occur, 
so as not to be left behind.  A classic example of this is reforming welfare benefits, a 
structure that creates little incentive for states to have more comprehensive benefits 
than states in their region (Francis, 1998; Rom et al., 1998; Figlio et al., 1999; 
Arsenault, 2000; Brueckner, 2000; Barrileaux et al., 2002; Volden, 2002; Berry et al., 
2003).  Additionally, if one state has created innovative policy, there are incentives 
for other states to adopt similar policies that deal with an issue.  Public policy is 
complex and lawmakers have to deal with multiple contentious issues at once.  If 
austerity measures are successfully adopted in a state, which by nature is politically 
difficult, a blueprint can be provided for other states looking to craft similar policy.   
It is difficult for states to create entirely new policy. Gray (1973) described 
innovation as being a law “new to the state adopting it,” and I see innovation as the 
beginning of a policy diffusion “chain.”  That is, State A adopts a new policy for a 




Adaptation is likely a prerequisite to the diffusion of policy primarily because, even 
regionally, no two states are completely alike.  Since there are often marked 
differences amongst states, we would expect to see policy changed at least somewhat 
before it can be widely adopted.  This, however, does not dilute the original 
innovation because the adopting states may never have been able to create a certain 
policy on their own.   
Indeed, adopting and adapting previously created policy is likely preferable 
for most states because the cost is far lower than creating something new.  Cost can 
be measured both in political and resource outlays.  In terms of resources, researching 
and creating new bills is time consuming and difficult.  Most state legislators do not 
have large staffs or year-round legislative sessions during which they can create new 
policy ideas.  Rather, legislative sessions are often harried affairs in which there is 
barely enough time to pass budgets and deal with pressing issues.  If ready-made 
solutions exist to a commonly shared problem, states have a great deal of incentive to 
adapt that solution to their needs. 
Political issues are also present for states attempting to create innovative 
policies.  Not all states can or want to be innovators.  Indeed, the process of creating 
innovative policy is difficult and potentially problematic politically.  Trying out an 
untested idea or implementing a new procedure is difficult in any line of work, 
including creating new theories in political science, but particularly so in politics 
where high profile setbacks can cost you an election.  Additionally, once states create 
innovations and adopt them, followers can see the ways in which a policy did or did 




also first-mover advantages for states that can create innovative policy because if the 
policy diffuses, the original innovator can claim a great deal of credit.  Politics cannot 
be separate from policy creation.  While we can imagine a scenario wherein 
legislators create policy simply to benefit their state, there is little doubt that 
politicians also want to win elections and continue being politicians.  Indeed, 
Mayhew (2004) argues that this is the most pressing goal for any member of a 
legislature.  As such, creating innovative policy that diffuses to other states could be a 
boon for a legislature’s reelection efforts.  Of course, the most important result for 
any innovation is that it work in the state in which it originated.   
 
State Legislative Professionalism 
From a state government perspective, adopting innovative laws that have been 
adopted in other states makes a good deal of sense.  State legislatures vary widely in 
terms of overall makeup.  Many states have citizen-legislatures, in which the 
members of the legislature often have other careers and are part-time lawmakers, 
while other states have highly professionalized legislatures that look more similar to 
Congress.  This change took place largely since the 1970’s, as state legislatures began 
holding longer sessions, hiring more staff, and providing more resource to legislators 
to create policy (Moncrief et al, 1996; Rosenthal, 1996; Meinke and Hasecke, 2003).  
While there has been some homogenization of the makeup of state legislatures, there 
is still a gap between the highly professionalized legislature of, say, California and 
the citizen legislature of Montana.
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If other states have already made an innovative policy that effectively solves a 
public policy problem, it is quite logical to suggest that other states will adopt similar 
policies, as a result of the varying degrees of resources, experience, and 
professionalization available.  In addition to these pressures, however, the level of 
professionalism within a state legislature can have an effect on producing innovative 
legislation.  Tolbert et al (2008) show that states with high levels of professionalism, 
institutional capacity, and technological prowess are more likely to create innovations 
and to keep doing so than are other states.  States without these advantages may be 
able to create innovative policy, of course, but it is much more likely to come from 
states with greater resources.  The policy will then diffuse amongst states that did not 
have the resources or ability to create it themselves. 
This has been shown in the policy diffusion literature, with scholars arguing 
that states with more capacity to create policy drive innovation and diffusion, and that 
the state originating the policies may be able to create more complex policies than 
their followers (Walker, 1969; Downs and Mohr, 1979; Clark, 1985; Mooney and 
Lee, 1995; Rogers 2003; Weissert and Miller, 2005).  Squire’s (2003) index of 
professionalism in state legislatures is also illuminating.  Squire looks at levels of 
institutional support, pay for legislators, and staffing all improve legislative 
professionalism, and the study notes that there are electoral consequences for 
professionalism, particularly in terms of incumbent re-election.  While more 
professional legislatures have lower turnover rates, there has also been an increase in 
electoral challenges in states as well as the quality of campaigns run, particularly for 




As states become more professionalized, then, they also have a greater 
lawmaking capacity. The policies examined in this study, though not necessarily 
highly technical, are controversial, and will likely require a legislature that can hold 
together a coalition in the face of opposition, both from the other state party as well as 
powerful, national interest groups.  This will be explored in the next section, as well 
as later in this chapter. 
 
Punctuated Equilibrium and Windows of Opportunity 
Policy diffusion has a distinct place in public policy research, but it is helpful 
to look at multiple, and related, policy theories in order to fully understand how and 
why diffusion occurs.  This section looks at how the punctuated equilibrium approach 
explains the rapid diffusion of policy and how policy entrepreneurs can influence 
diffusion.  Policy diffusion often takes place quite rapidly and widely, with a majority 
of states adopting policies within a relatively short period of time (Savage, 1985; 
Boushey, 2010).  In this way, policy diffusion research can also be informed by 
looking at the punctuated equilibrium perspective (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 
Jones et al, 1998; Robinson, 2004; Breunig and Kosky, 2006; Repetto, 2006; Givel, 
2010).  Punctuated equilibrium theory ties in nicely with diffusion, because diffusion 
is based on temporal events.  Diffusion is time-bound, particularly diffusion based on 
ideological or partisan issues.   
Events drive policy creation as much as any long term trends, and events are 
obviously difficult to predict.  This is one of the central problems in studying policy 




public opinion can shift, or the conversation can move to different issues.  When 
diffusion occurs, it often occurs rapidly, which is why punctuated equilibrium makes 
sense as a tool to understand policy diffusion.  Policy may not change and new policy 
many not be created for a long period of time.  If circumstances change, however, 
policy can be created quickly.  Events matter in policy creation, which the punctuated 
equilibrium perspective makes clear.  While events can cause policy to be created 
without much precedence shifting political circumstances can also make previously 
unpalatable or irrelevant policy that existed elsewhere suddenly attractive.   
Gun control legislation provides a good case in point here.  In December 
2012, a gunman named Adam Lanza opened fire at schoolchildren and teachers at 
Newtown Elementary School in Connecticut.  In the aftermath of these murders came 
a flurry of state and federal action (primarily on the part of President Barack Obama 
and not from Congress) aimed at prevention of these types of mass murder.  Gun 
control had been a simmering issue in the aftermath of several high-profile incidents 
including the attempted murder of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in 2011 and a 
mass shooting at a movie theater in a Colorado movie theater in July 2012, but the 
Newtown shooting provided a boiling point for the issue.  While this is just one 
example of events helping to create policy, it is illustrative in the sense that events 
caused enough pressure (or at least perceived pressure) on lawmakers to do 
something to fix a particular problem.   
In this case, of course, partisanship played a key role.  There are multiple 
ways to address the issue of mass shootings with gun control being one favored by 




is an effective solution to this problem: if there is less access to guns that can be used 
in mass shootings there will be fewer mass shootings.  This is not necessarily a bad 
argument but it is also not the only conceivable solution.  Increased security at 
schools, strengthening the nation’s mental health system, or tougher enforcement of 
existing gun laws are all reasonable responses to the issue, but there is no denying 
that any policy involving guns is politically and ideologically charged.   
While not all issues have the level of public scrutiny and partisan attachments 
that gun control does, the overall diffusion process can apply to any number of issues, 
as long as certain variables are accounted for.  Studying diffusion can mean looking 
at many different perspectives on public policy creation.  Many political actors are 
active in the agenda-setting and formulation stages of the policy process.  In terms of 
policy frameworks, policy entrepreneurs and innovation and diffusion approaches to 
the policy process argue that are many potential policy actors that can seize upon 
events or a need for a policy and attempt to set the agenda (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 
1972; Kingdon, 2010; Snare, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007).  Policy entrepreneurs create 
innovations at all levels of government, and have the ability to raise the probability of 
legislative action on these innovations (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Mintrom, 1997).  
The ability for these actors to set the policy agenda has vital consequences for policy 
diffusion.   
Policy entrepreneurs do not necessarily have to be legislators; indeed, they are 
often individuals with technical expertise or ideological ambitions.  They do, 
however, need politicians to enact the policies they prefer (Roberts and King, 1991).  




terms of innovation and diffusion, these types of actors can be a catalyst that helps 
create innovations.  While state governments can (and do) create innovative policy 
solutions, there is also a good deal of outside influence on this process.  Boushey 
(2010) argues this point persuasively, “Whereas policymakers may have a sincere 
interest in evaluating the costs and benefits of a particular policy 
innovation,...interest-group activists have issue-specific agendas and will look to 
capitalize on a window of opportunity to galvanize public support for policy change” 
(p. 30).   
 The question the issue of gun violence and the possible policy solutions to the 
problem, and others like it, poses is whether federal inaction led to the adoption of 
stricter gun laws at a state level or if these laws would be put in place regardless of 
any federal legislation.  It is clear that events often necessitate policy; governments 
may well simply wish to avoid the kind of mass murders that assault style weapons 
can facilitate (though the banning of these types of weapons has been difficult at the 
state level even in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook shooting).  Governments also 
may wish to be seen as “doing something” in response to a particularly high-profile 
tragedy or other such event.   
While one could argue that the presence of assault-style weapons always have 
the potential to be used in a mass killing, making the case that such weapons need to 
be banned is even more difficult in the absence of some sort of galvanizing event.  
Tragedies like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 led to 
action to make offshore oilrigs safer, but it took a particularly high profile event in 




governments often or always fall on the job and are unable to anticipate problems 
with policy solutions, but events have a way of clarifying issues and making them 
salient to lawmakers and the public alike. 
Traumatic or galvanizing events, then, open the windows of opportunity that 
political entrepreneurs can use to create policy change.  Recent scholarship, 
particularly Bouchey’s (2010) work, argues that policy diffusion has in large measure 
been melded with the punctuated equilibrium framework.  That is, policy changes 
incrementally (or not at all) for a long period, then suddenly moves very quickly 
(e.g.,Lindblom 1959; Givel, 2006; Mintrom and Norman, 2009).  These so-called 
“policy outbreaks” lead to rapid diffusion across states.  Boushey cites Amber alerts, 
term limits, and re-adoption of the death penalty as examples of policies that have 
diffused in this manner.   
Windows of opportunity, however, do not have to open only when there are 
high-profile events to catalyze policy change.  Rather, in an era of polarized politics, I 
argue that windows of opportunity for state policy creation are open far more often 
than not.  Boushey’s analysis of policy outbreaks is compelling and gives a 
reasonably clear picture of policy diffusion has changed.  This analysis goes a step 
further, and makes the case that partisan polarization opens windows of opportunity 
and keeps them open.   
For this study, I argue that windows of opportunity can be opened, and stay 
opened for certain policies, as the result of increased polarization at both the state and 
national level.  With the parties’ distinctiveness becoming ever more pronounced, 




have policies continually diffuse.  Rather, because the parties can rely on their shared 
partisanship as a way to determine which states they should look to when adopting 
new policy, and which policies are best suited to their states politically, windows of 




 Before continuing with the overall discussion regarding partisan polarization 
and policy diffusion, it is important to define the important terms in the discussion.  
Geographic proximity, as mentioned, is often used as an important explanatory 
variable in policy diffusion research.  Neighboring states share characteristics, and 
policies diffuse as a result of similar policy concerns.  For many policies, this makes a 
good deal of sense, though there will always be other factors at work in order for 
policies to diffuse from one state to another.  Geographic proximity, however, may be 
less important for the diffusion of policies with a partisan dimension than what I call 
partisan proximity.  Partisan proximity can be defined as simply the partisan control 
of a particular state, i.e. Republicans control the state legislature, or with more 
complex measures such as the proportion of control in a given state.  As an example, 
in 2014, Democrats controlled both Maryland and Minnesota’s state legislatures.  The 
proportion of that control, however, varied significantly.  In Maryland, Democrats 
held 76% of the seats in the state Senate and 69% of the seats in the House.  By 
contrast, Minnesota Democrats controlled 58% and 54% of seats, respectively.  Both 
states can be considered Democratic, but we could certainly say that Maryland is 




 I believe that both measures of state partisanship can provide information 
regarding partisan policy diffusion.  While perhaps Maryland may have an easier time 
passing a piece of legislation that is strongly associated with Democratic politics, my 
theory suggests that both states would be interested in the policy.  If polarization does 
drive the diffusion of policies that are primarily partisan in nature, the partisan control 
of a state legislature should have a major impact on whether that state adopts such a 
policy.  Additionally, with party distinctiveness, in terms of issue position, as high as 
it has been in decades states can use those cues and determine policies that may fit 
with their partisan affiliations.  With these lower overall policy learning costs, then, 
states do not need to border each other to borrow policy.  Indeed, from a partisan 
diffusion perspective, they need only share similar partisan goals.   
 In addition to state partisan proximity, I rely on measures of national 
polarization to help make the case that states can perceive who their partisan 
neighbors are and whether they should adopt certain policies.  This will be discussed 
in greater detail in the next section, but state partisanship and party identification has 
undergone a dramatic shift over time.  Party issue placement in states is more clear 
than in the past, and I attribute this to rising partisan polarization nationally.  There 
are multiple ways to define polarization at the national level, and Chapter 1 
introduced the party NOMINATE scores as evidence that polarization in Congress 
has increased over time.  Additionally, congressional output (or lack thereof) can be 
an indication of polarization, as the parties are often unable to compromise on a host 
of issues.  These measures, however, likely only show an indirect impact on state 




the specific NOMINATE scores for members of Congress, or exactly how many laws 
Congress passes.  They may, however, perceive an overall trend of partisan 
polarization at the national level which may help drive polarization in the states.  
While empirically showing this relationship will be left to future research, it is 




National and State Polarization 
So far, I  have examined the roots of how policy diffusion operates (including 
the importance of geography), the impact of state legislative professionalism, and 
how events and policy trends can impact state adoption decisions.  I have also defined 
the terms that are most important to the analysis overall.  This discussion is important,  
and these variables have all been considered in previous research. This analysis, 
however, examines policy diffusion primarily as a function of partisanship, and 
specifically partisan polarization.  States have, along with national government, 
become more polarized.  Indeed, state party ideological scores map closely with those 
states’ congressional scores (Shor et al, 2010).  State polarization, however, is not 
particularly easy to quantify.  Overall, there has been a lack of systematic study of 
state roll call voting patterns, primarily due to data limitations.   
There is no doubt that polarization has grown dramatically at the national 
level over the past several decades, both in terms of public opinion and in government 
generally (Bartels, 2000; Hetherington, 2001; Fiorina, 2002; Evans, 2003; Green et al, 




Monroe, 2011).   While partisan polarization in Congress has wide ranging impacts 
on national policymaking and the political process in general, this study is 
particularly interested in whether polarization has an effect on state policymaking.  If 
polarization has created more distinct parties, and it is safe to say that those 
phenomena are related, then states may be able to more easily identify their partisan 
neighbors and determine which policies they should borrow. 
Shor and McCarty (2011) look at all state roll call voting since the 1990’s and 
map the ideological ideal points for all state legislatures.  The show that state 
polarization has risen over the past decade and a half.  This is not true for every state, 
but there are 15 states, according to their measures, that are actually more polarized 
than Congress.  While, again, not all states exhibit the polarization levels at the 
national level, it is clear that polarization is an issue that scholars must wrestle with 
when studying state policymaking.  Indeed, scholars have begun to treat state 
governments similar to the national government in terms of their partisan makeup.   
Aldrich and Battista (2002) apply the concept of conditional party government 
to states, and argue that competitive party systems lead to polarization in states.  Lee 
and Hinchliffe (2014) expand on this work and systematically show that state party 
competition is highly correlated with higher levels of state polarization.  Party 
competition is measured by looking at multiple factors, including electoral 
competiveness and the ratio of each party in a given legislature.  I utilize variations on 
these measures when testing my theory of partisan diffusion, and Lee and Hinchliffe 
make the case that increased party cohesiveness has led to an increase in state 




aware of what party labels mean and that states can look to their partisan neighbors 
for policy inspiration.   
Additionally, state party line voting has become more pronounced over time 
(Carroll and Eichorst, 2013).   Party line voting is interesting, as it shows the 
cohesiveness of state parties.  While there will always be variation amongst state 
legislators in terms of their party allegiance, rising polarization may be one of the 
reasons we also see a rise in more party control in the states.  Once again, however, 
interparty competition is an important part of this story.  One of the central 
characteristics of conditional party government is that the parties should organize 
themselves around developing a coherent “party record.”  In this conception of party 
organization, party leaders must craft a party strategy, both electorally and 
legislatively, and rally their members around it.  If members can run (and win) on a 
party’s overall record, there will be more incentive to vote the party line. 
While this analysis is not about party organization specifically, it is the “party 
reputation” aspect that is of most use to partisan diffusion theory.  With party 
polarization, most states and voters understand what the parties tend to support in 
terms of policy.  Republicans in Texas may differ from Republicans in Ohio, for 
example, on some issues but there is broad party agreement overall.  Shor and 
McCarty (2011) do show that there is variance in terms of individual legislators, and 
there are more, say, liberal Republicans in state legislatures than there are in 
Congress.  With this caveat in mind, however, we can safely say that the parties’ 
positions, particularly at the national level, have become much more homogeneous 




preferences of voters (Garner and Palmer, 2011; Druckman et al, 2013; Jacobson, 
2013).  If, indeed, states are becoming as polarized as the national parties, it makes 
sense that state partisan attachments should be similar as well. 
In the 1950’s, Massachusetts and Mississippi were Democratic states, though 
one would be hard-pressed to find a policy area on which the Democrats in those 
states agreed.  Indeed, at the time, Democrats electorally dominated the South, though 
their policy positions, particularly on civil rights issues, were wildly divergent from 
their northern, more liberal counterparts.  At that time, knowing a state, or individual 
legislator, was a Democrat would likely not have been enough to discern their 
position on any given issue.  The lack of overall party cohesiveness was identified by 
the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties, which 
argued that the parties did not provide enough of a choice for voters on important 
issues.  While that may have been the case at the time, however, it is clear that the 
parties are currently much more distinct. 
I argue that, as a result of national polarization, there is an indirect effect on 
state polarization.  With clearer distinctions between the parties on a host of issues, 
states can look to their partisan neighbors for policy inspiration.  This partisan 
proximity is the main contribution of this analysis.  If states with similar partisanship, 
as well as similar proportions of partisan control, adopt a policy, I argue that their 
partisan neighbors will be more likely to do so as well.  The causal mechanism for 
diffusion, then, is the partisan proximity between states. 
This is not to say, of course, that partisan diffusion is the only way in which 




causal mechanisms for diffusion.  As mentioned, one of the most widely studied 
diffusion models is based on geography.  I believe that this type of diffusion (and 
others) almost certainly occurs, but the overall literature has yet to fully incorporate 
the role of partisanship and polarization in determining whether states will adopt 
certain policies.  Karch (2007) makes this particularly clear in a review essay on the 
prevailing theme in the diffusion literature and argues that the focus on regional 
diffusion needs to change.  
Most diffusion research relies on a theoretically unsatisfying explanation that 
focuses on the potential impact of geographic proximity.  Certainly, there is 
reason to question whether geography continues to exercise an important 
influence on policy diffusion in light of recent technological changes and the 
emergence of national communication networks... But more important, 
geography does not provide a clear explanation of why policies diffuse among 
the states. To develop a compelling explanation for policy diffusion, scholars 
must broaden their horizons beyond the default assumption that it is driven by 
geography (p. 63) 
 
Again, Karch recognizes that while geography certainly can have an impact 
on whether policies diffuse amongst the states it is certainly not the only, or even the 
best, explanation.  Partisan affiliation can provide additional information for states 
looking to create new policy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Spill, et al. 2001; 
Grossback et al., 2004; Volden, 2006; Marsh and Sharman, 2009).  Rather than 
changing innovative policies to match up with their neighbors, states attempt to 
decide whether adopting an innovative policy will move them too far away from their 
ideal policy point based on partisanship.  This is a far cry from simply adopting the 
policies of your geographic neighbors.  Instead, states will try to find policies that fit 




As we have seen, part of the difficulty in studying the impact of partisanship 
on state policy adoption has to do with data limitations, especially when the 
measurement relies on political actors to intuit where their state exists on an partisan 
spectrum as a comparison point to other states (Nice, 1982; Wright et al., 1985; 
Wright et al., 1986; Holbrook-Provow and Poe, 1987; Erikson et al., 1993; Berry et 
al., 1998; Brace et al., 2004; Berry et al., 2007).   Additionally, partisan diffusion may 
not refer to the position of a state generally, but rather its position on a particular 
issue.  Adoption of education policy may have no connection to a state’s level of 
progressivism (or conservatism) on welfare or civil rights laws (Gray, 1974).  It is 
also conceivable that innovation does not occur within one model of state behavior, 
but rather that there are several forces at work when policies migrate from state to 
state (Eyestone, 1977).  Of course, not every policy is partisan.  While states may be 
sending signals concerning their partisanship when they adopt a certain policy, it may 
also be the case that the policy is simply a particularly good fit for a state regardless 
of partisanship.   
  Same-sex marriage, for example, is not limited to one part of the country, and 
states in favor of same-sex marriage could look to innovators of that policy wherever 
it may have originated.  While geographic neighbors can also be partisan neighbors, 
the crux of partisan policy diffusion is that it is not reliant on geographic proximity.  
A Republican state next door to an innovator of progressive or liberal policy should 
have no greater interest in that policy than any other Republican state.  While, 
certainly, states can be more or less partisan and therefore willing to look at partisan 




diffusion of partisan policy.  Far-flung partisan neighbors have the same incentives to 
utilize innovations that geographic neighbors do: the work has been done, it (may) 
have been shown to be effective, and the policy can be adapted to fit their particular 
state and circumstances.  
If a state controlled by Democrats has no geographic relationship with an 
original policy innovator, it is unlikely they would even look at that state for policy 
guidance if their circumstances are different.  As Maryland legislative staff member 
Kristin Jones argued to me in our interview: 
We aren’t exactly surrounded by blue states...We’re likely to look at states 
that share our policy values.  Certainly on a lot of health policy we’ve 
followed New England states...I think we look to progressive states [when 
making certain policies]. 
 
Similarly, Republican Delegate Wade Kach, in response to how Maryland acts and 
how he acts when deciding what type of policy to promote, told me: 
A lot of what happened [in the 2012 session] was more because other states 
that are liberal were doing and then we had to [do it]...I would assume that if 
you go to a Southern state or a more Republican state you would find a 
solution that has less government involvement.  I think there are different 
ways to approach a problem.  If a Massachusetts solution was big government 
involvement and it improved the situation by 40% and whereas in South 
Carolina there was a lot less government and it improved the situation by 
35%, I would choose the South Carolina [solution] simply because 
government is not going to be as involved. 
 
Jones and Kach certainly come from different partisan and ideological 
perspectives, but partisan considerations have influence on crafting policy.  Kach 
even goes so far as to say he would take a small decrease in effectiveness (admittedly, 
a very small one in this scenario) in order to achieve a policy priority.  In this case, of 




successful with more government involvement, added costs or taxes may result and 
therefore, from the perspective of a Republican, cancel out any benefits.  This may be 
the case when polarization is at lower levels, as well.   
With the parties becoming more distinct on many issues, it may be that state 
legislators will begin to default to adopting policies created by partisan neighbors on 
a host of issues.  Jones’ take on the issue is similar and argues that Maryland is not 
particularly like any of the states that surround it in terms of partisanship.  Under this 
reality, Maryland has no choice but to look outside its region to find policy 
inspiration.  While not explicitly noted by Jones, this inevitably brings up the 
question of whether partisan policy diffusion has a larger reach than even this 
analysis postulates.  If a firmly Democratic state like Maryland has no partisan peers 
in its geographic vicinity, the state may indeed be likely to look outside its regional 
borders for more than solutions to hot-button partisan issues. 
Some states are more or less partisan than others of course, and a moderate 
Republican state may be willing to look at a Democratic innovation (or vice versa), 
but that type of policy congruence is likely not the norm when dealing with partisan 
issues.  Voter ID laws are a good illustration of this.  There is wide variety of in how 
states choose to make voters show proof of identification at the polls.  The majority of 
states require some form of ID, but an increasingly controversial provision of 
requiring a photo ID in order to cast a ballot has taken hold across the country.  







Figure 2.1: Voter ID Laws by State as of 2014 
 
 
Of the states that require a photo ID,  all currently have Republican control of 
both houses of the legislature.  In contrast, there is wide variety amongst legislatures 
that have not enacted any form of voter ID.  This could indicate that not all partisan 
neighbors agree with this particular innovation or that it simply has not diffused yet.  
Regardless, there is no geographic pattern to requirement of a photo ID to vote, but as 
Figure 2.2 shows, there is a distinct partisan pattern.  The shaded states represent 
those that have any type of photo ID as of 2014, but there is variation amongst those 
states in terms of voting procedures if a voter does not have an acceptable ID.  




the voter can produce an ID within two days of the election, which may be difficult if 
the voter does not have ID in the first place.  Most other states allow the voter to sign 
an affidavit certifying their identity.  While this is just one example of a partisan 
policy, it does show that innovation and adaptation exist for partisan as well as 
regional neighbors. 
Michigan state Representative Mike Shirkey, a Republican, was an influential 
an avid supporter of a right-to-work law in Michigan, was fairly blunt when asked 
about the effect of polarization and inaction in Washington on state policymaking. 
It does have an effect overall; the federal government is so large, and has 
grown in power.  A state cannot pass policy in a vacuum, so I think states 
have to be aware of what is going on in Washington. 
 
In general, states need to be aware of what is happening at the federal level for many 
reasons, not least of which is the need for states to implement federal programs.  
Additionally, and germane to Rep. Shirkey’s point, the policy climate created in 
Washington can move state policy as well.  Kristin Jones, the Chief of Staff for 
Maryland’s House of Delegates Speaker Michael Busch, also made this argument 
regarding Maryland’s frustration with federal inaction on prescription drug benefits. 
Though Maryland’s legislation was successful, it likely cannot have the same impact 
on the lives of senior citizens than more wide-ranging and better-funded federal 
legislation could.  She elaborated on this point as well, including other types of 
policies in her critique of federal intransigence.   
On the drug program, it was up to states to figure out drugs for seniors unless 
you could attach it to your Medicaid program because the feds weren’t gonna 
put any Medicare money towards that.  So, again, imperfect solution because 
you couldn’t cover everyone, you had to sort of narrow it down according to 
income eligibility and try to cover as many people as you could, financially 




become frustrating and I think it’s frustrating for a lot of people on the Hill 
who are trying to get things done and it’s frustrating for people on the state 
level and I think it does drive policy down at the state level as well. 
The frustration felt by states when being forced to deal with federal inaction is 
clear from Jones’s critique.  Maryland’s ability to pass legislation is somewhat 
unique, in that uniformly Democratic control lowers the costs of passing legislation 
favored by the majority, but there is still a limit on what states alone can pass. 
Jones provides a contrast to Shirkey’s point.  Jones works for a Democratic 
member of the Maryland House of Delegates, and sees federal inaction as a negative 
that has forced Maryland to create its own programs.  States may be willing to cede 
legislative control to the federal government when dealing with complicated 
programs, like Medicare or transportation policy.  Shirkey, while not specifically 
arguing that the federal government has no role in policymaking, does it make it clear 
that states need to be aware of a large, and growing larger, federal government.  
While this would suggest, of course, that the federal government should be 
contributing more in terms of actual policy, we have seen that policy outputs have 
declined dramatically.  This analysis, instead, posits that polarization at the national 




Interest Groups and Diffusion 
Interest groups have always been a part of the policy discussion in political 
science, though their presence and importance has certainly grown over time.  In 




greatly.  In the case of this analysis, partisan interest groups exert a great deal of 
influence on many policies that are considered by states.  Greg Mourad, Director of 
Legislation at the National Right to Work Committee, spoke with me about his 
group’s approach to state policymaking. 
We are a grassroots, membership based organization, people dedicated to that 
proposition.  What we do is try to pass RTW laws both at the state level, and 
we’d love to pass a national RTW law one day. We bring pressure to bear 
from the grassroots to the politicians, pressuring them to pass RTW laws 
whenever the opportunity is presented to them.  So, that means mobilizing 
their constituents, asking their constituents to contact them, through postcards, 
phone calls, emails now, petitions online.  What we do is mobilize 
constituents to put pressure on politicians.   
 
The sophistication of interest groups on all types of policies is an important 
consideration when we look at how diffusion occurs.  State policymakers are no more 
immune to this influence than their national counterparts, and legislative battles play 
out just as fiercely in state legislatures as they do on Capitol Hill. 
Of course, the study of interest groups and their effect on public policy is not 
new.  The pluralist vision of America has had many adherents and has informed much 
of the discussion in the interest group literature in political science.  Two classic, and 
opposing, views on pluralism come primarily from Dahl (1961) and Lowi (1979).  
Dahl argues in the tradition of Madison concerning group dynamics of power.  
Madison’s great concern, particularly in Federalist 10, was checking the influence of 
both the public and factions whose passions may overwhelm the proper course of 
government.  Dahl’s pluralism expands on this notion in his study on New Haven, 




coalesce into interest groups, and pressure lawmakers.  For Dahl, power is spread out 
across the political system and multiple groups can hold power.   
The system works primarily because no one group has inordinate amounts of 
power and various interests can be represented in policymaking.  No doubt, this is an 
idealized world that does not, and possibly did not, exist, but Dahl’s work is an 
important starting point in understand the ways in which interest groups act and the 
reasons behind their formation.  While New Haven doesn’t look much like modern 
America, there is certainly a kernel of truth today in Dahl’s study.  Interest groups 
still form around issues that are important to them, but the national scope and 
monetary influence that the largest groups possess seem to fly in the face’s of Dahl’s 
idyllic form of pluralism.   
Lowi’s (1979) work recognizes this and sees power in the policy process quite 
differently.  Granted, his study came later than  Dahl’s and had the benefit of seeing 
the changes in interest group power occurring and his insight is particularly 
compelling when we examine how interest groups function on a national level.  His 
concept of interest-group liberalism argues that those who should be making policy, 
particularly Congress, have abdicated their responsibilities for lawmaking to 
bureaucracies and particularized groups.  Importantly, and as a contrast to Dahl, he 
questions whether public membership in these groups actually leads to competition 
and better policy outputs.  Public membership in a group can be a boon for the 
organization, particularly at a grassroots level, but it does not necessarily imply that 




Olson’s (1965) seminal study on the topic of interest groups and collective 
action comes to a similar conclusion in that larger groups generally have problems 
providing for the collective good, and that more privileged members of the group will 
derive greater benefits from its work.  Large scale interest group work is problematic 
for its members and potentially for the policy process, as Lowi also contends that the 
large number of interest groups in the system lead to gridlock within the policy 
process.  This makes sense in the modern context as well.  Large, well-funded interest 
groups certainly exist on both sides of the partisan divide and add a layer of 
complexity to the policy process through political organizing and donations.   
As mentioned, many interest groups are partisan and create policy networks of 
their own, similarly to how policy entrepreneurs create policy networks amongst state 
actors.  National interest groups work not only with state legislators and power 
players to advance their policy goals, but also with state-based groups that share a 
similar agenda.  Jeremy Pittman, the Deputy Field Director for Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC), spoke with me about how HRC interacts with its state partners on 
issues of equality for LGBT Americans. 
I think those are the main things we talk about.  We talk about people, we talk 
about dollars, and then we have strategic expertise as well that we put on the 
ground.  We have state legislative director that’s a lawyer and we have a team 
of lawyers here who can draft legislation and actually have been involved in 
many, many states in drafting their civil unions bills or their marriage bills.  
We will provide talking points to legislators as well as to advocates.  We will 
help prepare testifiers for public hearings, those sorts of things we do. 
HRC is a well-known, well-funded interest group that provides a great deal of state 
support for its issues along with lobbying Congress on legislation ranging from Don’t 




The grassroots, as these groups are called, can provide lobbying support and 
illustrate that the interest group has a national presence.  On many issues, local 
grassroots are utilized by national groups to advance a national advocacy (Kollman, 
1998; Rosenthal, 2001; Walker, 2009; Wolack et al, 2011; Djupe and Conger, 2012).   
In other words, battles that may not be able to be fought in Congress can be fought at 
the state level.  Equality Maryland is an organization dedicated to equal rights for 
LGBT citizens, and I spoke with Executive Director Carrie Evans about their role as a 
grassroots arm of the national gay rights movement. 
You can imagine having a small organization trying to move a mountain for 
so many years.  Finally when the coalition came together and we all came as 
equal partners to the table, I mean that really transformed everything because 
we were doing things in concert, there were more resources at the table, all the 
in-kind staff HRC provided.  We wouldn’t have done it without that.  Plus, 
they were able then to leverage their membership and have fundraisers jointly, 
when the governor was traveling for his duties with the National Governor’s 
Association, in places like New Mexico and spend an extra day and do a 
fundraiser for the campaign.  So, that was really good because all the other 
national funders had pulled out of Maryland except HRC, so they became the 
lifeline of the campaign.  Half the campaign staff was in-kind, our 
communications director, our political director, most of our field organizers, 
our faith people were all HRC folks.   
 
This is not to say, of course, that all grassroots organizations are indebted to or even 
always interested in working with national groups.  It is the case, however, that 
creating coalitions of grassroots organizations in states, along with the fundraising 
and organizing capabilities of national groups, that leads to policy change and, 
potentially, policy diffusion. 
Additionally, the growth of technology has allowed grassroots groups to more 
effectively lobby for their preferred policy positions.  While lobbying policymakers 




process and allowed for groups to lobby while incurring lower costs to their 
organizations and members (Bergan, 2009).  When interest groups can create large 
list serves and enlist their members to contact legislators by email (rather than in 
person or on the phone), or sign an internet petition, or donate money to the 
organization online, the policy process can become much more open and accessible. 
Of course, this often necessarily leads to partisan outcomes (Koger et al, 
2009).  Policymaking is often less about the merits of a given bill, but rather the 
organized interests and partisan rhetoric surrounding legislation.  This is not to say 
that partisan policies cannot have merit, but that there is an increasing amount of 
partisanship surrounding bill passage. 
Human Rights Campaign (HRC) is one of the most influential national 
interest groups operating in Washington DC.  HRC’s focus is on ensuring equality for 
LGBT Americans, with a recent emphasis on marriage equality and ending workplace 
discrimination.  And, of course, HRC is a largely partisan organization that has an 
important lobbying presence towards Democrats (in particular) on Capitol Hill.  In 
addition to HRC’s national presence, however, the organization also works closely 
with local partners in the efforts to influence policy at the state level as well as 
nationally.  Pittman also spoke with me about mobilizing support for HRC’s cause at 
the state level. 
We mobilize our members and supporters, so when there’s an opportunity to 
engage people to take action, we do that.  Sometimes we lead those efforts.  
Often we are working in coalition with local partners and other national 
partners, sometimes in a bilateral fashion with a state group...Mobilizing our 
members is something we do when issues of equality are on a state ballot or in 
front of a state legislature as a matter of course.  That’s the number one thing 




Mobilizing support has become both more important and more realistic for large scale 
interest groups.  Technological changes have made it increasingly possible for interest 
groups to target certain legislators or agencies and make a coordinated effort with 
grassroots support to lobby those targets (Bergan, 2009).  With a lower bar on both 
ends, national staff and grassroots, the process of connecting with state-level groups 
who in turn lobby lawmakers has become more seamless.   
Interest groups exist around nearly every political issue, and often have both 
federal and state presences.  While interest groups certainly spend a great deal of time 
and effort attempting to influence federal policy, there are gains to be made at the 
state level as well.  Grassroots groups are able to form coalitions and work with 
national groups, and national groups can create their own state coalitions around their 
preferred issue.  In light of the difficult circumstances surrounding federal inaction of 
any wide-ranging or controversial policy, new tactics are required if interest groups 
are to be successful.  Pittman continues: 
We have increased focus on state-level work over time as it’s become clear 
that it is difficult to make advances in Congress...We are doing a lot of work 
on the federal level and it’s our core focus...but about 10-12 years ago when 
George W. Bush was in the White House and Republicans controlled both 
Houses of Congress we were battling against federal marriage 
amendments...At that point when it was difficult to see how we would make 
progress in Congress, HRC grew the emphasis on state level work and public 
education work...There was a recognition that growth wasn’t going to happen 
in Congress [exclusively]. 
 
State-level activism by interest groups is not new.  What is new, however, is the 
mobilization of state groups to assist national groups in lobbying state legislators or 




  In the absence of innovation at the federal level—whether through 
constitutional or statutory restrictions of federal power or the inability of the national 
government to legislate due to inter-partisan conflict in a polarized era—I argue that 
states will do so, where possible, instead.  While this may only be the case for high-
profile issues such as RTW, future research into this topic could be very beneficial in 
terms of understanding how to break gridlock in Congress.  Rather than a top-down 
approach, perhaps policymaking could eventually benefit from a bottom-up process. 
The partisan nature of interest groups has been studied, but it is not entirely 
clear how the ideology of these groups may affect policy diffusion (Haider-Markel 
and Meier, 1996; Roh and Haider-Markel, 2003; Gerber and Phillips, 2003; Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005; Grossman and Dominguez, 2009).  Interest groups respond to 
federal action or national policies debates and begin to ramp up state lobbying in 
order to advance their agenda.  So, while national debates drive interest group 
activity, much of that activity is manifested in state policies (Baumgartner et al., 
2009).  For diffusion, this matters a great deal.  While interest groups cannot force 
states to adopt a policy, they certainly can have an important impact.   
State legislators who are inundated with appeals from groups all over the 
country on a particular issue may be more persuadable than those in Congress who 
deal with that sort of pressure on a daily basis.  And, even if we grant the premise that 
state politics have become more polarized than they have been in the past, there is 
little doubt that with fewer professional legislatures, lower electoral stakes, and much 





Changes in technology and in the political process in general have made the 
learning process for states much simpler and the geographic restrictions for policy 
diffusion less relevant.  Information costs are far lower in the modern era for states 
looking to emulate innovative policies.  Technology itself contributes to this, but new 
forms of policy entrepreneurship exist than did so in the past.  As mentioned, policy 
entrepreneurship, broadly understood, is the concept that interested parties take 
advantage of “windows of opportunity” to create new policy that addresses some 
urgent need (Kingdon, 1995). Certainly, this type of activity still exists and has been 
well-documented by policy diffusion scholars, particularly when dealing with 
effective or relatively non-controversial policies (Knoke, 1990; Roberts and King, 
1991; Mintrom and Vargari, 1998; Mintrom and Norman, 2009).  Access to policy 
knowledge has only become more accessible for states, as the information costs faced 
by policy entrepreneurs are greatly lessened by both technology and the explosion of 
national special interest groups.  This is relevant to the study of policy diffusion, 
particularly because many controversial or partisan movements in state government 
come from groups with a national, partisan focus. 
Policy knowledge, of course, includes knowledge of outcomes, which is one 
of the reasons that diffusion is particularly attractive at the state level.  States have 
limited time and resources, and understanding policy outcomes is important when 
deciding to adopt or adapt a policy from another state.  Partisan diffusion, however, is 
a bit different in the sense that many partisan or controversial issues have clearer 
effects; same-sex marriage is unlikely to have wide ranging economic impacts, for 




campaign and do the will of their constituents.  While this may sound a bit cynical, it 
is also the case that the parties have ideological considerations that go beyond politics 
and into the realm of principle.  While not all partisan diffusion policies follow this 
blueprint, it is certainly the case that the policy knowledge for partisan diffusion is 
almost always going to be clearer than for more complex policy.  The organized 
interests that have increasingly sprung up around these partisan issues make the 
consequences all the more obvious.   
The impact of interest groups on policy diffusion, then, is a particularly 
fruitful area for further study.  Interest groups with a partisan focus understand the 
realities of policy creation at the federal level: for the foreseeable future, not much is 
likely to occur.  States, then, provide an avenue for partisan interest groups to enact 
their agenda.  With rising state polarization lowering learning costs for both states and 
interest groups, the potential is there for interest groups to exert a great deal of 
influence over policy diffusion by facilitating the opening of windows of opportunity, 
and lending states their specific policy expertise. 
 
 
Case Study: State Lottery Adoption 
 State lottery adoption is a classic case of geographic diffusion.  Lotteries are 
ubiquitous, with 44 states running some form of lottery in 2014.  Every state in the 
continental United States either has a lottery or shares a border with a state that does.  
Berry and Berry (1990) provided one of the seminal studies of geographic diffusion 
by examining the importance of both internal state characteristics and regional 




results were clear: the number of states that adopted lotteries as well as the influence 
of neighboring states had a positive effect on state adoption of a lottery.  Additionally, 
Berry and Berry found that internal state characteristics make them more or less 
likely to create innovative policy.  If states are in poor fiscal health or if it is in an 
election year, they found that the state was more likely to adopt a lottery.   
One of the reasons this work is so compelling is the nature of state lottery 
adoption itself.  Lotteries are, in many ways, a perfect test case for geographic 
diffusion.  If a neighboring state runs a lottery, that state can gain huge benefits in 
multiple ways.  First, of course, is an overall upgrade in revenues at a relatively low 
cost.  Indeed, many state lotteries argue that revenue enhancement is the first and only 
goal (Garrett, 2001).  Lotteries do not provide a service, per se, but their revenues are 
used to fund many state program, including expensive propositions like public 
schools.  Once the lottery is implemented, the only the main cost incurred by a state is 
if someone happens to win.  Lotteries, then, are in many ways an obvious choice for 
states that are in need of revenue enhancements.  While the overall economic benefits 
for a state are clear, there is also an economic downside.  Lottery ticket sales are 
correlated with poverty rates, which has led many to characterize lotteries as a “poor 
tax.”  Despite a very low likelihood of winning, lower-income individuals make up a 
significant percentage of lottery players (Blaylock et al, 2007).   
 The second, and most compelling reason to study lotteries as a mechanism for 
policy diffusion, is the pressure that states face to implement it.  If a neighboring state 
is reaping the benefits of a lottery, a state will be hard pressed to ignore them.  Not 




borders to buy tickets (Knight and Schiff, 2012).  In addition to losing revenue, states 
without lotteries are also assisting neighboring states that have lotteries by “forcing” 
its citizens to go elsewhere.  If a state without a lottery is bordered by a state with 
one, it is quite likely that individuals living near the border (or perhaps further away) 
will take their business out of state.  This is a legitimate concern for states, and the 
main reason the concern exists is geography.  Certainly, the vast majority of people 
would not travel multiple states to buy a lottery ticket.  While there may be 
exceptions to this rule, it is unlikely that states need to worry about other, 
geographically unconnected states running lotteries.  A state may, however, feel 
pressure to adopt a lottery if neighboring states are essentially taking revenue that 
might otherwise stay home.  
Clearly, then, geography matters when studying state lottery diffusion.  This 
analysis, however, is primarily interested in partisan polarization and its relationship 
to state policy diffusion.  Lottery adoption, however, does not have an obvious 
partisan component.  While there is a moral issue to consider, it is an issue that can 
cut right or left, depending on point of view.  Those on the left may decry the 
regressive nature of the lottery as a poor tax, while those on the right may cite 
morality concerns.  Of course, these generalizations are fairly interchangeable, and 
left-leaning individuals could also see the lottery as a moral danger, as well. 
Table 2.1 shows the adoption of state lotteries, taking into account the partisan 
control of the state legislature at the time the policy was adopted.  What is most 
interesting from Table 2.1 is the fact that the majority of lottery adoptions occurred 




adoption may be a relatively non-partisan issue.  If states can make decisions about a 
fairly significant policy and revenue stream when partisan power in the state is 
divided, that speaks volumes about the political calculus involved in adopting a state 
lottery.   
Table 2.1 also shows the adoption rate for states with Democratic and 
Republican control.  We can see several interesting trends.  Democratic states adopted 
lotteries at a lower rate than states with divided government and at nearly the same 
rate as Republican states (2% of observations, and 2.9%, respectively).    
 
Table 2.1: State Government Control and Lottery Adoption, 1964-2010 
 Democrat Divided Republican 
 (Adopt) (Not Adopt) (Adopt) (Not Adopt) (Adopt) (Not Adopt) 
       
Lottery Adoption 12 463 24 599 5 169 
       
Total
5
  475  623  174 
 
 
In terms of divided government, states adopted lotteries in 4% of the observations.  
So, while Republican controlled states adopt fewer lotteries during this time period, 
the difference in terms of the rate of adoption is minimal.  We also see the relatively 
few instances in which the Republican Party controlled state legislatures during this 
time period, but again, the rate of diffusion is nearly identical for all three categories. 
State lottery diffusion is a classic case of geography playing a vital role in the 
expansion of the policy.  Lotteries are a clear example of a policy where geography is 
the most important explanatory variable; it creates competition and incentives for 
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neighboring states.  While partisan neighbors are arguably able to ignore innovations 
based on partisan proximity, it is very difficult for a neighboring state to ignore a 
lottery on its doorstep.  As any diffusion scholar would recognize, however, not all 
policies are as neat and clean as lotteries in terms of a pattern of diffusion.  There are 
many variables, including partisanship, that can be causal mechanisms in diffusion.  
This discussion, however, highlights the ways in which scholars have looked at 
diffusion in the past.  It is fairly well established that geography matters, but one of 
the goals of this analysis is to demonstrate that partisan neighbors can operate 
similarly to geographic ones.  Exploring the dominant mode of diffusion research is 




This chapter laid out a theoretical outline for how states decide to adopt 
policies with a partisan dimension, and introduced the concept of partisan proximity 
as a causal mechanism for policy diffusion.  Partisan polarization has brightened the 
lines between the parties, and thus has had an indirect effect on state policymaking.  
If Republicans in Montana are largely the same as Republicans in South Carolina, 
states can draw all sorts of cues from their fellow partisans in terms of what policies 
they should adopt.  In the following chapters, I analyze two policies from a partisan 
diffusion perspective: same-sex marriage and right to work.  I argue that diffusion of 
partisan policies should occur amongst partisan neighbors, and that these policies are 





Chapter 3: Same-Sex Marriage and Partisan Diffusion 
 
S  3. The domestic relations law is amended by adding two new sections 10-a and 
10-b to read as follows:    
 
S 10-A.  PARTIES TO A MARRIAGE.  1. A MARRIAGE THAT IS OTHERWISE VALID 
SHALL BE VALID REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE 
ARE OF THE SAME OR DIFFERENT SEX.    
2.  NO GOVERNMENT TREATMENT OR LEGAL STATUS, EFFECT, RIGHT, 
BENEFIT, PRIVILEGE, PROTECTION OR RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO 
MARRIAGE, WHETHER DERIVING FROM STATUTE, ADMINISTRATIVE OR 
COURT RULE, PUBLIC POLICY, COMMON LAW OR ANY OTHER SOURCE OF 
LAW, SHALL DIFFER BASED ON THE PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE BEING OR 
HAVING BEEN OF THE SAME SEX RATHER THAN A DIFFERENT SEX.  WHEN 
NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBIL- ITIES OF 
SPOUSES UNDER THE LAW, ALL GENDER-SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OR TERMS 
SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN A GENDER-NEUTRAL MANNER IN ALL SUCH 
SOURCES OF LAW. 
 
 New York Marriage Equality Act (Passed June 24, 2011) 
 
SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows:  
 (A) THIS SECTION MAY NOT BE CONSTRUED TO INVALIDATE ANY OTHER 
PROVISION OF THIS TITLE.  
(B) Only a marriage between [a man and a woman] TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT 
OTHERWISE PROHIBITED FROM MARRYING is valid in this State.  
(a) Any marriage performed in this State that is prohibited by this section is void.  
 Maryland Civil Marriage Protection Act (Enacted March 1, 2012) 
 
Sec. 2. RCW 26.04.010 and 1998 c 1 s 3 are each amended to read as follows:  
(1) Marriage is a civil contract between ((a male and a female)) two persons who have each 
attained the age of eighteen years, and who are otherwise capable. 
(2) Every marriage entered into in which either ((the husband or the wife)) person has not 
attained the age of seventeen years is void except where this section has been waived by a 
superior court judge of the county in which one of the parties resides on a showing of 
necessity. (3) Where necessary to implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under 
the law, gender specific terms such as husband and wife used in any statute, rule, or other law 
must be construed to be gender neutral and applicable to spouses of the same sex. 
Washington Senate Bill 6239 (Enacted February 13, 2012) 
Amendment 774 





(b) Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. As a matter of 
public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting this 
unique relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of 
society and its children. A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid 
in this state. 
(c) Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman, which, when the 
legal capacity and consent of both parties is present, establishes their relationship as husband 
and wife, and which is recognized by the state as a civil contract. 
(d) No marriage license shall be issued in the State of Alabama to parties of the same sex. 
(e) The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex 
that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction 
regardless of whether a marriage license was issued. 
(f) The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any common law marriage of parties of 
the same sex. 
(g) A union replicating marriage of or between persons of the same sex in the State of 
Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be considered and treated in all respects as having 
no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state as a marriage or 
other union replicating marriage. 
Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment (November 7, 2006) 
 
§ 16: Marriage. 
 
(a) The marriage contract is to be considered  
in law as a civil contract. Marriage shall be constituted by one man and one woman only. All 
other marriages are declared to be contrary to the public policy of  this state and are void.  
 
(b) No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized by the state as entitling the  
parties to the rights or incidents of marriage.  
 
Article 15, Section 16 Kansas State Constitution (Adopted April 5, 2005) 
 
 
The ability for same-sex couples to be granted legal status has, for the most 
part, rested under the purview of state governments.  Throughout the 1990’s and into 
the early 2000’s, there was a concerted effort by many states to restrict or discourage 
the establishment of civil unions or marriages for same-sex couples, often through 




decided shift towards legal recognition of same-sex couples, with momentum 
building both nationally and at the state level.   A Washington Post/ABC poll in 
March 2013 found that acceptance of same-sex marriage in particular had undergone 
a dramatic shift in a matter of a decade.  In 2003, just 37% of Americans supported 
gay marriage, with 55% opposed.  By 2013, those figures had flipped, with 58% in 
favor of same-sex marriage with 36% saying it should be illegal.
6
  In a period in 
American politics in which social issues often took a back seat to the economy and 
foreign policy, it is striking that a policy once viewed negatively by most Americans 
has become one that is widely accepted. 
The obvious question is: what changed?  While there are many possible 
answers, an important consideration is the relatively rapid diffusion of pro same-sex 
legislation at the state level.  In just over half a decade, fourteen states recognized 
same-sex marriage as a right in their state when before no such legislation existed.  
While a small minority of states currently recognize marriage between same-sex 
couples as legal, it is likely that, at the least, more states will continue to agitate for 
the policy in the near future.  State legitimization of same-sex marriage, in particular, 
has replaced what may be considered the stopgap notion of civil unions or domestic 
partnerships.  While these types of relationships had been the focus of LGBT allies 
and organizers, and even a third way for moderates in both parties, it seems the tide 
has begun to shift inexorably in the direction of same-sex marriage (SSM). 
This, of course, has been a dramatic shift.  Throughout the 1990’s, and as far 
back as the 1970’s, states had been steadfast in their opposition to SSM and other 
                                                 
6
 Cohen, John.  “Gay Marriage Support Hits New High in Post/ABC Poll.  The Washington Post. 




same-sex domestic partnerships.  Many states enshrined a ban on the institution in 
state constitutions, making it much more difficult for supporters of SSM to create new 
legislation in those states.  The federal government also had a role in attempting to 
limit same-sex partnerships, passing the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 and 
President Clinton implementing Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy in the military.  It is 
clear that SSM was on the minds of many in the 1990’s, but most of the action taken 
was to prevent same-sex couples from marrying or accruing the benefits to which 
opposite-sex partners were entitled.  While there is no doubt that SSM in particular 
has become much more widely accepted nationwide,  the shift has occurred in less 
than two decades.   
 Recall that partisan diffusion depends on the type of policy being considered 
and the partisanship of the state in which that policy is considered.  This chapter will 
analyze the previous literature on SSM, with an emphasis on state policy diffusion, 
and will make the case for SSM as a policy that fits under partisan diffusion.  It will 
also explore a specific case of SSM adoption in Maryland in 2012, utilizing 
interviews with state policymakers and interest group leaders that detailed their role 
in the legislation’s passage.  It will conclude with an empirical study of SSM and 
partisan policy diffusion over time. 
 
 
Partisan Diffusion  
Same-sex partnerships have certainly been a focal point for many when 
considering issues regarding LGBT Americans, but this is relatively new in terms of 




set their sights primarily on anti-discrimination ordinances.  Studies particularly 
focused on geographic and demographic circumstances in determining whether the 
policies would pass (Wald et al, 1996).   Additionally, issue salience and morality 
politics were studied as catalysts for the creation of anti-discrimination policies 
(Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996; Haider-Markel and Meier, 2003).  Morality policies 
are distinctive, primarily because they do not easily lend themselves to compromise, 
they generate conflicts of basic values, and are simple to understand and widely 
salient (Mooney and Schuldt, 2008).   
Viewed in this light, it is clear that SSM is a morality policy.  It is not overly 
technical; SSM is simply, though not without controversy, about allowing couples of 
any sex to marry and have the same rights as heterosexual couples.  It creates fissures 
on a basic value level; SSM is viewed as a basic right by its supporters and as (at 
worst) a moral evil by its detractors.  It is particularly unlikely that opponents or 
proponents will be swayed by arguments made by the other side, as both sides see the 
issue less as public policy as more as an issue of fundamental moral importance.  
Indeed, SSM can certainly be seen as the quintessential morality policy facing 
policymakers at the moment. Indeed, the shift in public opinion on the issue certainly 
creates pressure, on both sides, to advocate for their position. 
While SSM can be viewed as a morality policy, it is also a partisan policy in 
contemporary terms.  While Karol (2012) argues that this has not always been the 
case, that in fact SSM was a largely apolitical issue during the 1970’s-1990’s, I argue 
that this is no longer the case.  While certainly there are some Republicans in favor of 




For the 2012 presidential conventions, each party made an explicit declaration of its 
stance on SSM, with the Democrats supporting the issue for the first time.  The 
Democrats, though, certainly left room for dissent on religious grounds: 
We support marriage equality and support the movement to secure equal 
treatment under the law for same-sex couples.  We also support the freedom 
of churches and religious entities to decide how to administer marriage as a 




Republicans, on the other hand, made it clear that the party is not in favor of a move 
towards marriage for same-sex couples: 
We reaffirm our support for a Constitutional amendment defining marriage as 
the union of one man and one woman.  We applaud the citizens of the 
majority of States which have enshrined in their constitutions the traditional 





There is very little ambiguity in either of these statements on the ways in 
which the parties view marriage.  While Democrats recognized the freedom of 
religious organizations to sanction marriage as they see fit, the party also supports 
marriage equality as a legal right.  The Republican platform was, perhaps, even more 
strongly worded in its defense of traditional marriage.  In addition to clearly stating 
the party’s belief in the concept of marriage, the platform’s text also criticized the 
Obama Administration’s declaration that the Justice Department would not continue 
to enforce the provisions relating to the Defense of Marriage Act.  Indeed, the issue of 
marriage appears in multiple sections of the party platform, indicating the importance 
with which Republicans view the issue. 
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 The line of demarcation between the parties on the issue of SSM could not be 
clearer: One party opposes the creation of SSM and the other favors it.  Layman and 
Carsey (2002) may argue that this is an example of conflict extension; that is, elite 
attitudes can polarize party identifier attitudes.  One would likely be very hard 
pressed to find a culturally conservative voter supporting SSM (and likely same-sex 
right in general), with the reverse being true for a social liberal.  As such, this issue is 
a particularly good one to analyze in terms of the impact of partisanship on the 
diffusion of the policy amongst states.  SSM policy diffusion should follow the 
partisan policy process as described in Chapter 2.  Recall that effective policy may be 
adopted by geographic neighbors regardless of the prevailing partisanship within a 
given states.  Partisan policy, on the other hand, may not diffuse regionally but can 
transcend geographic borders and diffuse on the basis of partisanship.  This chapter 
will make the case that, in addition to state partisanship, national partisanship drives 
the creation and adoption of partisan policies such as SSM. 
 
 
Literature Review and History of Same-Sex Marriage in the States 
As we have seen, SSM is an important policy politically and from a value-
based perspective.  While many tend to think of SSM as “the” gay rights issue, the 
reality is a bit more complex.  Relationship recognition is not the only issue in which 
the LGBT rights movement is invested, nor is it often the type of policy that states are 
most prepared to enact.  Jeremy Pittman, the Deputy Field Director at Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC), presents the timeline that HRC and LGBT allies generally pursue. 
I don’t think marriage equality is the highest calling of the gay rights 




progression in how we make progress for LGBT Americans.  In most places, 
the first piece of pro-equality legislation is a bill that will prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.  
Somewhere along there, maybe before or after, we can work on anti-bullying 
legislation, because who wants to see kids bullied?  So this is something that 
has broad appeal.  So this is the first thing. And then, somewhere along this 
time frame, you see hate crimes protections as well.  And then you start to 
move into relationship recognition.  After we’ve made it safe for people to 
come out, they know that they’re not going to lose their jobs or their housing 
because they come out, then people start to see them as real people, as people 
with families, and then we can start talking about relationship recognition. 
  
This progression not only set the stage for a more radical shift in favor of gay 
rights (marriage), but also highlighted LGBT issues as civil rights (anti-
discrimination laws).  One of the most interesting features of this approach was the 
notion of “putting civil rights on the ballot;” that is, allowing states to create or deny 
protections based on referenda or ballot initiatives (Gamble, 1997).  LGBT rights 
were not the only civil or social issues to be placed on the ballot, but the prevalence 
of this approach does have interesting implications for policy diffusion theory.  I will 
explore the ballot initiative process later in this chapter in a discussion about SSM 
legislation in 2012, specifically in Maryland, but legislating through ballot initiative 
has become a major feature in terms of SSM policy.  It not only creates challenges for 
interest groups such as HRC, but also new issues for state legislatures to consider.  If, 
as in Maryland and Maine in 2012, legislative action is not the final word on the issue 
and passage then leads to a referendum on Election Day, legislatures may be more 
willing to pass controversial legislation like SSM and allow the voters the final say. 
As noted, SSM and other relationship recognition policies are not considered 
only in terms of creating these rights, but also restricting them.  There were efforts in 




efforts were not primarily geographic nor were they monolithic in their opposition to 
same-sex partnerships (Barclay and Fisher, 2003).  Legislation regarding same-sex 
couples is not limited to one part of the country, and states in favor of expanding or 
limiting these partnerships could look to innovators of that policy wherever it may 
have originated.   
In studying the wave of anti- same-sex legislation in the 1990’s, Haider-
Markel (2001) found that it was internal state characteristics and the actions of 
national, conservative interest groups that drove adoption and not necessarily 
traditional diffusion patterns.  Additionally, SSM bans diffused quite rapidly, more so 
than most other policies that diffusion scholars traditionally study.  This cannot be 
attributed to primarily to geography; states from Hawaii to Nebraska to Alaska 
banned SSM in the late 1990’s into the 2000’s.  Clearly, other processes were at work 
than those that are generally associated with geographic diffusion.  This analysis 
posits that state partisanship is the key feature in the diffusion of SSM policy. 
Opponents of SSM continued their strategy into the 2000’s with bans on the 
ballot in 28 states from 2000 to 2008 (McVeigh, 2009).  This process occurred 
concurrently with the wave of pro-SSM legislation, however, creating an interesting 
diffusion dynamic.  This, however, does not necessarily eliminate the learning 
process; states may simply rely on different sources in order to consider adopting new 
policies.  There is little doubt that national interest groups have partisan agendas, and 
the pattern of same-sex marriage diffusion argues that partisanship plays an important 
role in adopting these policies.   These findings lend credence to the overall argument 




they once were when studying policy diffusion.  With policy learning much more 
widespread and accessible than ever before, relying solely on geographic neighbors 
for innovative policy is potentially counterproductive.  That is, of course, unless the 
issue has regional significance that does not exist elsewhere. 
SSM bans were also influential in terms of national politics.  The 2004 
presidential election, in particular, was impacted by the rapid diffusion of ballot 
initiatives banning SSM.  Smith et al (2006) examine voter turnout in swing states, 
Ohio and Michigan, and argue that the presence of SSM on the ballot increased voter 
turnout overall.  The study is particularly interesting from a diffusion standpoint 
because Michigan and Ohio are regional neighbors.  The results show some support 
for the notion that the ballot fight drove up turnout, but that the presence of SSM only 
helped President Bush in Ohio.  In both states, however, support for banning SSM 
correlated strongly with voting for the President, even after taking voting patterns 
from 2000 into account.  Additionally, Republicans were able to utilize SSM as a 
vehicle to reach religious voters and mobilize them to come out in support of 
President Bush (Campbell and Monson, 2008).  On the other side of the issue, since 
2012, six states have adopted SSM, whereas opponents have had a much more 
difficult time in the last half decade.  In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down part of 
the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act and, as we have seen, polls consistently show 
national support growing for same-sex marriage (Bowling and Pickerill, 2013).   
The 2004 election, then, is a good example of how national politics can affect 
state policymaking, and vice versa.  With SSM on the ballot in two states, opponents 




President Bush.  While, as we will see, SSM was once an issue that did not have a 
major partisan component, the rise in pro-SSM ballot initiatives and legislation in the 
early 2000’s may have injected a partisan dimension into the debate.  When public 
opinion was firmly against SSM and most of the policy being created around the issue 
involved banning it, there was little political upside in arguing for expansion of gay 
marriage rights.  Additionally, partisan polarization was lower during the 1990’s in 
general, but the rising tide of polarization coincided with the parties carving out 
distinct positions on the issue.  
This is not a new phenomenon in American political history, at least in terms 
of the parties shifting and coalescing around new, dominant issues.   LGBT rights 
issues were, however, not necessarily considered an example of party realignment, as 
the public did not see these issues as particularly important (Lindaman and Haider-
Markel 2002).  This work was not able to take into account, however, the sudden 
increase in both elite level interest in LGBT rights, particularly regarding marriage, 
and the salience of the issue to the public.  It is this salience that helps create party 
realignment on certain issues (Carmines and Wagner, 2006).  Once again, conflict 
extension can help make sense of this shift.  In this conception of partisan change, 
party activists drive change on issues (Layman et al, 2006).  Recall from Chapter 3 
that partisan interest groups have gained a great deal of influence in the policymaking 
process as well as creating new electoral considerations for policymakers.  With 
greater sophistication in grassroots mobilization and the increasingly loud voice of 
each party’s ideological base, it makes sense that base issues have become even more 




Rights Campaign, described the sophistication that is required to mobilize grassroots 
across the country.   
We have field organizers that we put on the ground that help mobilize people 
and help organize in the LGBT community, as well as communities of faith 
and the general public and all sorts of ways that we mobilize people. We are 
everywhere around the country.  We operate with 30 volunteer communities at 
HRC; these are not state-based, they’re city-based, so we have strong 
volunteer communities in 30 cities around the country.  And so, because we 
have volunteer leaders in all these communities, they have excellent 
relationships with state lawmakers already and so as folks begin to think about 
how do we advance equality, those conversations are happening and we’re 
part of those conversations because our volunteers are part of those 
conversations or because our paid staff are part of those conversations, or 
both.   
 
Conflict extension, then, is a compelling explanation for the sudden shifts 
around SSM, both in terms of public opinion and party activity.  Particularly in the 
Democratic Party, elites and the grassroots made the issue more salient as an 
important and salient Democratic issue.  The Republicans, of course, already opposed 
the issue and continued that opposition even as the Democrats shifted towards 
creating pro-SSM policy at the state level. 
Though same-sex marriage may not have been a purely partisan issue in the 
1990’s, primarily because Democrats had not completely evolved towards acceptance 
of the issue, it has certainly become one.  Indeed, the primary partisan shift that has 
occurred around same-sex rights has come from within the Democratic Party.  Unlike 
many issues that have shifted their partisan positioning, such as race and trade policy, 
the parties’ stance on LGBT rights has remained distinctive (Karol, 2012).  Though 
Democrats have only recently begun to advocate strongly for expansion of LGBT 




also never advocated against these rights.  This is, of course, unlike the civil rights 
movement that saw ardent opposition from inside the conservative Dixiecrat wing of 
the Democratic Party in the South.   
While Democrats were relatively slow to embrace the gay rights movement, 
conservatives in the Republican Party largely prevented the cause of LGBT rights 
from becoming a bipartisan issue, and by extension, SSM as well.  Social and 
religious conservatives are much less likely to support the establishment of same-sex 
marriage.  While there has been a marked shift in many demographic and political 
groups on the subject in the last several decades, evangelicals and conservative 
Republicans have not substantially changed their views even as acceptance generally 
has risen (Olson et al, 2006; Sherkat et al, 2011).  Race also plays a role in approval 
of SSM, with African American Democrats more opposed than Democrats generally 
(Lewis and Gossett, 2008).  Secular considerations, such as partisanship, also seem to 
matter less to African Americans than moral or religious considerations on this 
particular issue (Sherkat et al, 2010). 
While Democrats are now broadly considered supportive of LGBT rights and 
SSM, the party has evolved on the issue.  This is certainly not a new occurrence in 
American politics.  Both parties have evolved in issues over time, and there is a large 
literature devoted to studying these shifts, including shifts on cultural and “morality” 
policy (see Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Adams, 1997; Wolbrecht, 2000; Lindaman 
and Haider-Markel, 2002; Karol, 2009; Carmines et al, 2010).  It is certainly not an 
easy or especially fast process for parties to evolve on any issue, but cultural issues in 




took nearly 100 years after the end of the Civil War and went from a cause celebre of 
the Republican Party to a central tenet of Democratic policy.  Of course, not all 
morality issues switch party allegiances as radically or publically as civil rights, and 
neither did LGBT rights or SSM.  That being said, however, the Democratic adoption 
of LGBT rights has been fairly dramatic as we saw earlier in this chapter.   
Karol (2012) illustrates that SSM had largely been an apolitical issue; while 
liberals were quick to embrace LGBT rights in the 1970’s and 1980’s the Democratic 
Party as a whole resisted embracing the movement until well into the 1990’s.  In 
addition to the increasing acceptance of LGBT rights by the public, the more 
progressive wing of the party created pressure on elected Democrats.   As a result, 
Democrats in general have become more supportive of SSM over the past several 
decades, and liberals in particular exhibit high levels of support for the policy (Lewis 
and Gossett, 2008; Baunach 2011).  This is of particular interest when looking at 
diffusion policy.  SSM and LGBT rights, once a fringe and controversial issue even 
within the Democratic Party, has now achieved wide-ranging support nationwide.  
Democratic states, then, have much more political capital to spend on this issue, and 
the rapid diffusion of the policy amongst Democratic states speaks to the clear change 
in Democratic priorities.  
There is no doubt that gay rights are not only the province of the Democrats, 
nor is it the case that all Democratic legislators or states share the same views.  There 
is a small but vocal minority in the Republican Party that has begun to advocate for 
gay rights (Log Cabin Republicans come to mind) and are more focused on economic 




in the minority for Republicans, as conservative voters are the most rigid in their 
opposition to SSM.  Indeed, groups like GOProud and Log Cabin Republicans, who 
support gay rights and a “big tent” philosophy within the GOP, were conspicuously 
absent from the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) held in 2013.   
Despite calls from moderates within the party to distance Republicanism from 
it’s historically conservative stance on LGBT rights and SSM in the wake of the 2012 
election, conservatives within the party seemed particularly loathe to abandon what 
has become a key part of their particular governing philosophy.
9
  Though SSM is not 
the only policy that separates these more moderate groups from the Tea Party and 
conservative wing of the GOP, this fissure illustrates the clearly shifting priorities of 
many within the Republican Party.  While Democratic states have been clearly 
moving in a direction of adoption, Republican and conservative states have either 
stayed firm in their opposition or have moved in the opposite direction through 
legislation or ballot initiative.   
There are political considerations that surround controversial policy like SSM, 
but there are also there are structural issues at work in terms of the ways in which 
different levels of government act and respond to one another.  The federal structure 
in the US, particularly on morality issues, allows for states to consider policies on a 
case-by-case basis, but the federal government has increasingly become more 
involved in these types of issues (Mooney, 2000).  Policies such as DOMA and Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell in the 1990’s were created while a wave of states voted on whether to 
ban SSM and enshrine the ban in their constitutions.  While it would not necessarily 
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be correct to say that the federal policies were created at the behest of states, there is 
little doubt that the prevailing policy wind in the 1990’s focused on limiting marriage 
rights for same-sex couples.  
In addition to federal legislation, gay rights have been at issue on the federal 
level primarily in the courts and the executive branch in the last decade, and there has 
been a basic understanding that the definition of marriage is and has been primarily a 
state issue.  Indeed, this has also been the case with other controversial policies, such 
as medical marijuana (Pickerill and Chen, 2008).  Congress, then, has had little direct 
influence over SSM since the passage of DOMA, and has since seen part of that law 
struck down by the Supreme Court.  This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
Congress has no effect on whether states choose to consider SSM policies.  Indeed, 
my theory argues that polarization in Congress and the lack of action on controversial 
policies like SSM will spur states to take up the issue. 
Same-sex partnerships, from both a pro and con perspective, could offer a 
compelling example of partisan diffusion.  SSM would not be considered geographic 
in the sense that neighboring states would need to compete with each other if one of 
their neighbors adopted it.  While there could be some small scale economic impact 
of legalizing same-sex partnerships, causing people to move across state boundaries 
to accrue benefits, regional neighbors would be unlikely to compete with one another 
to provide more (or fewer) rights for LGBT couples.  At the same time, however, 
there is a clear partisan impetus to enact same-sex policies.  As we have seen, the 
parties have made their positions perfectly clear on the policy, and this clarity has 




demarcation for accepting or rejecting SSM at the state level on the basis of the 
prevailing partisanship in the state.    
Although national opinion is trending towards acceptance of same-sex unions, 
it is far from settled at any level of government.  Indeed, with many state 
constitutions defining marriage as the union between one man and one woman, 
changing the policy in those states (even if there was a high level of interest in doing 
so) would be no small task.  An additional variable, and one that this study does not 
specifically examine, is that SSM is also subject to the rulings of courts.  This is 
certainly an important consideration, and a good deal of work has been done on this 
subject (i.e., Liu and Macedo, 2005; Sack 2005; Stoutenborough et al, 2006; 
D’Emilio, 2007; Klarman, 2013).  There is no doubt that the courts exert a large 
amount of influence over the SSM debate, and could affect whether states decide to 
consider and/or enact SSM policy, pro or con.  States still do, however, take up the 
issue legislatively or on the ballot, and so it remains a policy that is ripe for study and 
placement in the policy diffusion literature, despite the fact that the courts play a key 
role in deciding whether such policies are constitutional.  What happens to the policy 
after the fact is, in some ways, random; the courts in a particular state can only rule 
(or decide to rule) on SSM policy if the case is brought before them.  So, while it is 
important to acknowledge the role of the courts, in terms of policy diffusion I do not 
consider this influence to be a key variable in whether states decide to take up the 
issue of SSM. 
States as a whole have an interesting and convoluted role in the history of the 




has long been a particularly thorny public policy concern.  In the next section, I 
examine the case of one particular state, Maryland, which has itself had a long history 
with the issue.  Maryland passed SSM legislation in 2012 after several years of 
debate, though the issue was not settled in the legislative session, but rather at the 
ballot box.  I spoke with a number of individuals involved in the debate, and their 
insights give an interesting and important viewpoint into that debate.  In the next 
section I will examine Maryland’s SSM debate in 2012 and place it in the context of 
the overall policy diffusion process.   
 
 
Case Study: Maryland and Same-Sex Marriage 
2012 was a watershed year for same-sex marriage recognition in the states.  
Maryland, Washington, and New York all passed legislation permitting same-sex 
marriage, a federal appeals court overturned California’s ban on same-sex marriage, 
Maine’s voters passed a referendum to allow gay marriage, and Republican New 
Jersey Governor Chris Christie was presented with, and ultimately vetoed, a marriage 
equality bill.
10
   Maryland has long been at the forefront of the same-sex marriage 
debate at the state level.  It became the first state to pass legislation banning same-sex 
marriage in 1973, and in 2012 became the sixth state to legalize the institution.  On 
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February 17, 2012, Maryland’s lower chamber in the General Assembly, the House of 
Delegates, narrowly passed a marriage equality bill 72-67, the same bill it had failed 
to pass a year earlier.  Less than a week later, the state Senate passed the bill 25-22.  
 The years leading up to 2012 saw a concerted effort by Democrats in the state 
legislature and liberal interest groups to force the topic into the statewide 
conversation.  The bill passed the state Senate in 2011 before failing in the House of 
Delegates, and much of the conversation leading up to the 2012 General Assembly 
session was consumed by the debate over whether the entire legislature would vote to 
legalize same-sex marriage.  With the strident support of the state’s Democratic 
governor (and 2016 presidential hopeful) Martin O’Malley, the bill passed through 
the General Assembly and was signed by O’Malley on February 23. 
Maryland itself was in a unique position to create SSM legislation.  While not 
necessarily the most liberal state in America, Maryland is undoubtedly one of the 
most staunchly Democratic.  A Republican has not won Maryland’s presidential 
electoral vote since 1988 (and have won the state only three times since 1960).  Only 
five times since the turn of the 20
th
 century has Maryland elected a Republican 
governor.  Since the end of the Civil War, Republicans have held the House of 
Delegates only three times, and the Senate just once (Smith and Willis, 2012).  
Clearly, the issue for most legislation in Maryland is not whether Democrats can 
agree with Republicans, but if Democrats can agree with other Democrats.  Carrie 
Evans, the Executive Director of Equality Maryland, spoke with me about the 





We knew we didn’t need any Republican votes to pass the bill.  We certainly 
wanted Republican votes to pass the bill, but we knew it wasn’t necessary.  
The real problem was the conservative Democrats, and even moderate 
Democrats who were supporting civil unions and not marriage.  That was the 
chasm up until 2012, even with the governor. Even until November 2011 he 
was all for civil unions, as was some of the LGBT caucus.  So that was always 
the battle.  We ended up with three really great Republicans voting for the bill, 
but that mostly had to do with personal relationships. 
 
One of those Republicans was Wade Kach, a Delegate from Baltimore County, a 
relatively more Republican and conservative area of the state.  Kach voted for the 
Civil Marriage Protection Act in 2012 after having opposed the measure in previous 
legislative sessions.  Kach told me that he had a change of heart on the issue, 
particularly after speaking with same-sex parents and their children who testified 
before the House of Delegates in support of the bill and who spoke about the ways in 
which denial of marriage benefits affected their families. 
I’ve never had an issue with how people conduct their lives.  I’m more or less 
a libertarian when it comes to issues like [same-sex marriage]...I’d always 
been opposed to it, had come to the conclusion that maybe civil unions was 
the way to go...Seeing the commitment between the people who were 
witnesses and the child support issue, by the next day I’d decided I’d had 
enough of this, I was just going to vote for it.  
 
While some Republicans like Kach had decided to vote for a bill sponsored 
and championed by Democrats, the Democrats themselves could not rally their entire 
caucus around passage.  Socially conservative Democrats, particularly African 
American delegates in Baltimore City and Prince George’s County, were unhappy 
with the legislation and joined with Republicans in an attempt to defeat the measure.  




on the House floor.
11
  So, while partisanship was crucial to the bill’s passage, it is of 
course not the case that partisanship, even in a place like Maryland, always acts 
monolithically.  Indeed, ideological fissures can exist on controversial issues like 
SSM, which may contribute to the fact that not all states with Democratic leadership 
have passed SSM legislation. 
The Senate passed the legislation in 2011, and did so again in 2012 with the 
House following suit.  One of the provisions of passage, however, was that SSM was 
subject to a ballot initiative to be voted on by Maryland’s citizens on Election Day in 
November.  The petition quickly gained more than enough support and Question 6 
immediately became the center of the debate.  Prior to 2012, SSM had never been 
successful at the ballot box.  This may be due to a host of factors, not least of which is 
that pro-SSM diffusion did not really begin until 2006.  Prior to that date, SSM had 
not won in a legislature, and indeed the opposite position had been enshrined in many 
states.  Maryland’s ballot initiative, then, faced a number of historical and logistical 
issues. Jeremy Pittman, Deputy Field Director at Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a 
pro-LGBT interest group in Washington D.C., explained the difficulties in working 
on ballot campaigns in the past. 
Ballot campaigns are very expensive propositions....We’re talking $5 or $6 
million into a ballot campaign, and if you have three or four of these on the 
ballot in any given year it’s a lot of resources you’re talking about having to 
raise.  The other thing to think about is that it’s only very recently that we 
have gone to the ballot proactively to pass pro-equality legislation.  
Historically, we, the LGBT community, have faced ballot initiatives because 
our opponents have put us in that position...When we were being attacked at 
the ballot, we long said that civil rights shouldn’t be on the ballot! [laughs] 
We messaged that for years and years, but now we’re gonna have to go back 
to the ballot and going from a position of this shouldn’t be on the ballot to 
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now having to put this issue on the ballot.  So that’s a messaging challenge 
and a tough place to be in.   
 
Ballot campaigns involve a statewide effort in which individual legislators are not the 
targets of influence but rather the voting public.  These campaigns are neither easy 
nor cheap.  The Washington Post estimated that, in 2012 and 2013 alone, nearly $1 
billion in 11 states on ballot initiatives.
12
  While this certainly tracks with the increase 
in spending on political campaigns generally, it also makes these campaigns of even 
greater importance for the groups involved.  The $1 billion spent in 2012 and 2013 is 
only likely to grow, as ballot initiatives and referenda become an even greater part of 
the state policymaking process.   
 The question, of course, is the extent to which ballot initiatives, as well as 
state referenda, affect partisan policy diffusion.  While many of the issues brought up 
in ballot initiatives are of a partisan nature, others are certainly less clearly partisan.  
One can imagine geography mattering a great deal when looking at ballot initiatives, 
and partisan national groups can also be very influential in both getting policy onto 
the ballot and getting it passed.  While a pro-LGBT rights group like HRC clearly has 
a disincentive to bring up ballot initiatives around SSM and instead work through 
state legislatures, the 2012 fight involved the voters deciding the issue, including two 
meant to ratify a legislative vote.  The ballot process is often subject to greater 
scrutiny than the legislative one, presumably because there are more potential voters 
to reach than the ones that reside for part of the year in the statehouse.  In Maryland, 
the ballot campaign was subject to millions in advertising dollars from a host of 
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interest groups, both for and against the initiative’s outcome of legalized gay 
marriage. 
Clearly, there was great interest in and action around the issue, perhaps not 
coincidentally because 2012 was a presidential election year and SSM was an issue in 
the presidential race.  As we have seen, the presence of SSM on the ballot in 2004 
impacted turnout in the presidential race in key swing states.  In May, after several 
years of hedging on the issue, President Barack Obama, a Democrat, endorsed the 
concept of SSM during a speech in Albany.
13
  Obama, who had long maintained that 
his views were evolving on the issue of marriage equality, faced a great deal of 
pressure to come out in favor of the policy after his Vice President, Joe Biden, made a 
statement in support of SSM.   
 Obama’s pronouncement came several months after Maryland and 
Washington had passed legislation, and less than a year after New York had done so.  
National polling suggested that voters were increasingly in favor of SSM, and Obama 
was ramping up an election campaign and reaching out to the base of the Democratic 
Party.  We cannot be certain whether Obama’s change of heart over the issue was 
directly related to state activity on SSM, and we can surely point to shifting national 
opinion on the issue as a catalyst for Obama’s conversion.  While it is significant that 
Obama supported SSM in a year in which two legislatures had passed legislation 
creating the institutions in their states, it is important to note that both Washington 
and Maryland’s debate over SSM legislation was not decided only in the statehouse.  
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Both legislative victories were tempered by the fact that, in order for SSM to become 
law, the voters would decide through a referendum on Election Day in November. 
As with many controversial, high profile issues, interest groups played a 
major role in the legislative process.  Carrie Evans, articulated Equality Maryland’s 
strategy for mobilizing votes in support of SSM in Maryland. 
How we did leverage it was saying “This is gonna happen.  The momentum is 
there. It may not happen this year, it may not happen next year, but we’re 
going to have marriage equality, so let’s just do it and get it over with.”  There 
was this air of inevitability. 
 
There is little doubt that, in a state like Maryland, the inevitability of same-sex 
marriage recognition must have strong appeal for many legislators.  While not 
necessarily the most liberal state in the nation, Maryland is certainly one of the most 
staunchly Democratic.   
The partisan composition of the state, then, had an outsize impact on the 
likelihood of passing same-sex marriage.  This dynamic also makes Maryland an 
interesting case in terms of partisan policy diffusion.  There are few states as 
Democratic as Maryland, though to be sure New York and Washington are 
Democratic states in their own right.  Recall that this analysis is primarily based 
around partisanship and not ideology; partisanship is more readily understood than 
ideology, and partisan politics is the driving force behind partisan policy diffusion.  
Democrats in Maryland may have agreed with marriage equality from an ideological 
perspective, but partisan political considerations ultimately held the most sway over 




Maryland, of course, did not pass same-sex marriage recognition in a vacuum.  
While it was only the sixth state to uphold marriage recognition for gay couples, other 
state, and the District of Columbia, were working on the issue around the same time 
as Maryland.  Kristin Jones explains the importance of this work, including both 
geography and partisanship. 
I think it helped us that DC was doing actual marriage, because to the extent 
that they are so close you have Maryland residents driving 15 minutes from 
their homes and getting married across the border in DC and they weren’t able 
to do that in their own state.  So I think that helped.  We weren’t exactly in 
great big company when we did it, there were six states at the time, and then 
three of us fell at once: Maine, Maryland, and Washington, we all went in the 
same year. 
 
Though partisan diffusion is distinct from geography, it is not the case that geography 
has no relevance to partisan diffusion.  Indeed, having a partisan and geographic 
create a policy that is attractive to your state is certainly better than the alternative.  In 
the case of Maryland and Washington, D.C., there is a clear partisan attachment as 
well as geographic.  The influence of D.C. on Maryland is ingrained in places like 
Montgomery and Prince George’s counties, in which many residents work in the 
District.  This example serves to illustrate the point that while it is certainly easier to 
think of partisan and geographic diffusion as mutually exclusive, the reality is likely a 
bit murkier. 
 Additionally, Maryland passed SSM legislation during a clear window of 
opportunity.  Recall from Chapter 3 that windows of opportunity for policy creation 
are exploited by policy entrepreneurs who use extant factors to push policy change.  
Organizers like Carrie Evans and Jeremy Pittman (and their counterparts on the right) 




or force states to make decisions on policy.  They are skilled, however, at recognizing 
an opening for policy creation and creating campaigns to help ensure that their 
preferred policy is enacted.  Evans says: 
New York was very instrumental.... What we gained from other states is the 
messaging that was working, sharing the materials, those kinds of resources 
that they were using to win votes is what we used the most.  Particularly 
messaging and focus groups and all of that.   
 
Sharing information, creating coalitions, and refining tactics is one of the main 
reasons that partisan diffusion can effectively occur without geographic 
considerations. While certainly physical proximity has its advantages, many of those 
advantages matter less given recent technological advancement.   
 Maryland is a recent, and compelling, example of the partisan dynamic of 
state policy diffusion.  State legislators and staff as well as interest group leaders 
acknowledged that Maryland was influenced by other states that had passed the 
legislation.  The General Assembly had also rejected SSM in previous years, lending 
credence to the notion that Maryland was unable to pass the legislation without other 
states providing a window of opportunity.  Those involved in the debate acknowledge 
that partisanship was an important factor in the state’s adoption of SSM, and that the 
influence of partisanship on picking which policies to pursue in Maryland is growing.  
There was also a recognition that national politics affect what Maryland chooses to 
do, and that Capitol Hill-style partisanship has filtered down to the state level.   
Certainly, Maryland is not a representative state in terms of partisanship.  As 
mentioned, it is one of the most staunchly Democratic states in terms of state and 




legislative politics.  That said, this analysis shows how partisanship, more so than 
geography, impacts the policies states elect to pursue.  Despite its strong Democratic 
majority, Maryland relied on other Democratic states to sanction SSM before doing 
so itself. 
 2012 was, undoubtedly, the year in which SSM turned a corner, both in terms 
of public opinion and legislatively.  As we have seen, the politics around SSM have 
changed at the national level, though states have been a somewhat different matter, 
with states utilizing different processes for enacting or banning. SSM This section 
looked specifically at Maryland’s fight to enact the legislation and the history of SSM 
in Maryland.  In the next section, I look at how SSM, both enactments and bans, have 
spread nationwide.  Using this descriptive data, I also will posit empirical hypotheses 




Same-Sex Marriage and Partisan Diffusion 
 Enshrining SSM in state law is a relatively new phenomenon. Earlier in this 
chapter, we saw that, while SSM has been a topic of political conversation for 
decades, the push to legalize marriage equality really occurred during the last decade.  
Though the courts have been involved in determining whether states must perform 
marriages between couples of the same sex, this analysis focuses on legislative 
success for SSM enactments and bans, using partisanship as a key variable in 
determining if states are likely to pass such a law.  In order to determine whether 




SSM across the country
14
.  Figure 3.1 shows this progression, highlighting the states 
that allowed for SSM through legislative vote by 2009, and Figure 4.2 from 2010 to 
2013.
15
  The rapidity with which the policy diffused, as well as the pattern of 
diffusion, is somewhat striking. 
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 SSM is also legal in Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, and New Mexico as 
a result of court rulings, but are not included in this analysis.  As mentioned, the courts have an interest 
in SSM policy, but the diffusion of this type of action is almost certainly going to be different than 
state legislative diffusion.  While the backdrop of legal action is always present in these type of 
debates, for the purposes of studying the impact of partisanship on SSM diffusion , for this study, I 




Figure 3.2: Legalized Same-Sex Partnerships in States by 2013 
 
 Figure 3.1 shows the very small number of states that legalized SSM through 
statute.    At first glance, of course, there may be some support for a geographic 
argument.  Connecticut, Vermont, and New Hampshire are all states in the Northeast, 
and have arguably similar populations and cultural values.  They also, of course, 
share partisanship.  Figure 3.2 tells a different, and quite interesting, story about the 
diffusion of SSM.  States across the country adopted the policy within four years of 
the original three, which gives credence to the notion of windows of opportunity 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Of course, the pockets of states that have enacted SSM 
protections are geographically concentrated to a certain degree.  No southern states 
have enacted laws that enable SSM, nor is it legal in the plains states or the Mountain 
West.  Rather, SSM is concentrated in the Northeast, West Coast, and upper Midwest, 




 Geography is an unavoidable feature for policy diffusion research.  If one is 
studying states, it needs to be acknowledged that states exist as geographic as well as 
political entities.  Indeed, as we have seen, geography is often looked at as the central 
feature of policy diffusion research.  This chapter, and analysis in general, seeks to 
determine whether partisanship matters to a greater extent than geography in the 
diffusion of SSM policy.  In addition to enactment of SSM policy, it is also important 
to consider states that have explicitly prohibited SSM, either through constitutional or 
statutory provisions within state law.  Over time, many states that have banned SSM 
have moved from a law prohibiting SSM to amending their state constitutions to 
legally allow marriage only between one man and one woman.
16
  Figures 3.3 and 3.4 
look at the progression of these enactments from 1995-2000.   
 It is clear from Figures 3.3 and 3.4 that bans on SSM spread incredibly rapidly 
across the country.  In just five years, 42 states banned SSM either through legislative 
statute or constitutional amendment.  The latter became even more widespread in the 
early 2000’s, with many states that had already banned SSM through the legislature 
deciding to add the prohibition to their constitutions.  By 2013, 29 states had 
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 While anti-SSM policy cut across state partisan lines, this analysis is also 
interested in whether national partisanship and gridlock affect the spread of 
controversial policies such as SSM.  Figure 3.3 looks at the states that had banned 
SSM by 1995, and this is not simply a random date.  While one can argue about the 
exact date of the onset of hyper-partisanship in Washington, the 1994 midterm 
elections are a reasonable starting point.  1994 was a true wave election; Republicans 
gained 52 seats in the House and control of the chamber for the first time in over 40 
years, 8 Senate seats, and 15 state legislatures (Brady et al, 1996).  It was seen, from a 
political science perspective, not only as a Republican victory, but also as a partisan 
realignment among the electorate that began during the Reagan Administration and 
culminated in 1994 (Jacobson, 1995; Abramowitz  and Saunders, 1998).   
 In light of this, then, I have chosen 1994 as a cutoff point in terms of national 
polarization.  For SSM adoption, all policy came after this point, but bans occurred as 
far back as 1973.   This, then, should serve as an important test of national 
polarization on the adoption of SSM policy.  The descriptive statistics presented in 
this section give us an indication that, particularly for pro-SSM policy, state 
partisanship is a driver of policy diffusion.  While it is less clear for anti-SSM policy, 
in that many states adopted the policy in the 1990’s regardless of partisanship or 
geography, I still expect that national partisanship and polarization are significant 
drivers of the rapidity with which anti-SSM policy diffused during that time period.  
In the next section, I lay out my theoretical expectations and describe the data and 






Hypotheses and Data 
This analysis in general is focused on the impact of partisanship on policy 
diffusion, and this chapter specifically looks at the effects of partisanship on same-sex 
marriage policy.  In particular, the interest lies in whether state partisanship and 
national polarization have a positive effect on the diffusion of SSM. Chapter 2 
examined this theoretical notion in more detail, but the basic argument is that rising 
polarization results in state looking to their partisan neighbors when adopting policies 
with a partisan dimension.  
My dependent variable measures the adoption of SSM policy.  If a state 
adopted or banned SSM in a given year, the variable is coded as “1” and coded as a 
“0” if the policy was not adopted.  I expect that both state and national partisanship 
variables will positively impact SSM diffusion, and make two hypotheses about SSM 
diffusion. 
 
Hypothesis 1: State partisanship variables, including policy diffusion and partisan 
proximity, will lead to same-sex marriage adoption in similarly partisan states. 
 
Partisan proximity, here, is measured by two variables: state legislative control and 
the proportion of Democrats in a state.  Legislative control is coded with a 1 when 
Democrats control the legislature and 0 when a legislature is under Republican 
control.  For pro-SSM, I expect both of these variables to be positive, as pro-SSM 
policy is associated with Democratic states, and negative for SSM bans.   




coded as 1 if a state with similar partisan control adopts SSM policy within two years 
of a partisan neighbor.  Given my theory, this variable should positively correlate 
with higher rates of policy adoption.  Additionally, I add a measure of the total 
number of SSM laws passed (Democratic laws for pro, Republican for anti), and 
argue that the more partisan neighbors that have adopted the policy, the more others 
are likely to adopt it as well.  I also include measures of electoral competition for 
state legislative seats as a proxy measure for the level of state professionalism, and 
measures of ideology for both state legislatures and state citizens.   
These states have their own increasingly polarized politics, and partisanship 
affects the types of policies states are likely to consider.  More than that, of course, is 
whether other similarly partisan states have enacted SSM policy.  The focus of this 
analysis is on diffusion, and specifically diffusion amongst states that share 
partisanship.  The citizen ideology variable is a revised version of Berry et al’s (1998) 
measure and captures more recent data, and correlates state citizen ideology to 
interest group ratings, ADA and COPE, for their members of Congress.  The state 
ideology variable is the NOMINATE measure of state government ideology which 
utilizes Common-Space congressional ideology scores to construct the measure and is 
similar to the citizen ideology measure (Berry et. al. 2010).   
 In addition to state level factors, national partisan polarization should have an 
impact, though likely an indirect one, on SSM diffusion.  While SSM adoption has 
occurred exclusively in an era of heightened polarization, SSM bans were adopted 




prior to 1994 and 1 after, should have an effect on the SSM bans that occurred rapidly 
during the 1990’s and 2000’s, leading to my second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: National polarization will have a positive effect on SSM bans. 
   
Polarization, however, can also be looked at as more than a binary state.  
Therefore, Figure 3.5 shows consideration of same-sex partnership policy given 
polarization levels in the House and Senate.
17
  The box and whisker plots depict the 
passage and non-passage of SSM legislation, with the Y-axis showing House and 
Senate polarization levels from 1994-2012.  We can see that states are more likely to 
pass these policies when both chambers are at high levels of polarization.  House 
polarization is higher in general than Senate polarization, but Figure 3.5 shows that 
the consideration rates in states are similarly affected by House and Senate 
polarization.  Clearly, however, the spread of not passing the legislation is far greater 
than that of passage.  This is, primarily, because there are far more instances of states 
that take no action on same-sex policies during my time frame than states that do 
consider it.  
Figure 3.6 looks at the relationship between House and Senate polarization 
and laws seeking to limit SSM.  This relationship paints a slightly different picture.  
“Not pass” in both graphs is at a higher level than consideration for anti-SS policy.  
There are two possible explanations for this.  First, many of these policies were 
considered and enacted during the 1990’s and early 2000’s, when polarization (while 
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high) was not as high as it became in the latter years of the Bush administration and 
into the Obama administration.  So, while the relative level of polarization in both 
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 is similar, it may be the case that states that considered anti-
SS policy were able to accomplish their policy goals before polarization reached 
astonishingly high levels.   
Second, it may also be the case that legislation seeking to limit same-sex 
marriages are affected by partisan polarization differently than pro-legislation.  
Certainly, overall approval of same-sex rights in general were at a far lower level in 
the 1990’s, and public opinion has changed dramatically in the two decades since 
same-sex partnerships became an important part of American public policy.  While, 
again, levels of polarization are high for both “pass” and “not pass,” polarization 
























































































Figure 3.6: House and Senate Polarization and SSM Bans 
 
 
Presidential and midterm election years are added to my models as control 



































































high-profile elections may exert influence on the types of polices states consider.  Not 
all states use the federal election calendar, but there may also be more incentive to act 
on issues that are important to a particular party’s base during an election season in 
which the legislature is under increased scrutiny.  Additionally, the partisan 
atmosphere at the national level is certainly greater during election season.  As a 
result of the two-party system, elections are often about drawing lines of distinction 
between Democrats and Republicans.  Particularly in midterms, in which voter 
turnout is reduced and often driven by the parties’ base, partisanship at the national 
level is heightened.  There is certainly a relationship between elections and 
polarization, but this analysis is primarily interested in legislative action as opposed 
to elections or public opinion. 
 Finally, time is an important consideration when studying policy diffusion. 
Policies like SSM may diffuse rapidly, but a time component is crucial. My unit of 
analysis is state year, which captures whether a state passed SSM legislation in any 
year.  Once a state adopts or bans SSM, they drop from that particular data set.  The 
logic, here, is that marriage represents the end-point of the SSM debate.  While states 
can pass any number of restrictions, in the case of SSM bans, on same-sex 
relationships, banning marriage constitutes the end of the debate from the “ban” 
standpoint.  Of course, states that have banned SSM could certainly reverse course, 
but from the standpoint of banning SSM (or adopting it), the states drop out of the 









Since the outcomes of my dependent variables are binary I utilize probit 
regression models.  I run two models, one for pro-SSM diffusion and the other for 
SSM bans.  In effect, this model is an event history analysis, and follows in Berry and 
Berry’s (1990) footsteps.  My dataset contains every state adoption of SSM policy 
from 1973 through 2013.  Importantly, in the model I control for time, with states 
dropping out of the dataset once they create a lottery.  So, for each state year in which 
SSM is not adopted, that state receives a “0.”  If SSM policy is adopted, the state 
receives a “1” and is dropped from the dataset  .The results from the pro-diffusion 
model are displayed in Table 3.1.   
The results show mixed support in terms of my expectations for partisan 
policy diffusion.  The partisan diffusion variable does reach statistical significance, 
but the predicted effect shows that, substantively, we cannot say much about the 
impact of this variable on SSM adoption.  The number of SSM adoptions by 
Democratic states does have a large substantive impact, but its coefficient does not 
reach traditional levels of statistical significance.  Achen (1982) argues that models 
with relatively few numbers of observations may call for a relaxation of statistical 
significance rules, but in this case it may not apply.  It does, however, apply to the 
legislative control variable, which nearly reaches traditional significance levels.  
Having Democrats control the state legislature does have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of adoption, but once again the substantive impact is relatively small.  
None of the other state level variables reach statistical significance for the model, nor 




Table 3.1: Partisan Diffusion of Same-Sex Marriage Adoption 
        
Variables Adopt P 
Predicted 
Effect 
    

















































    Log Likelihood -57.984 
  Pseudo R2 0.209 
  N 740     
Standard errors in parentheses 




 Some of this may be due to the relatively limited number of states in my 
dataset that have adopted SSM.  Since SSM adoption is a fairly new policy, 
particularly in terms of legislative adoption, it may simply be that the patterns of 
diffusion are not yet fully defined.  Future research into this policy, then, is likely 
needed to determine whether SSM adoption can be predicted by state level partisan 
variables. 
Table 3.2 shows the results from the anti-SSM model.  In this case, we see a 
clear impact of partisan diffusion, along with a hugely substantive effect.  SSM bans 
diffused quite quickly amongst partisan neighbors in the mid-1990’s, which may 
explain this effect, but the impact of partisanship on SSM ban diffusion is quite 
pronounced in comparison with the pro-SSM model.  Curiously, however, legislative 
control does not reach statistical significance.  This may be because both Democratic 
and Republican states adopted the policy throughout its history, and thus does not 
have the clear-cut Democratic dominance inherent in SSM adoption.  The other state 
level variables, similar to model 1, do not reach statistically or substantively 
significant levels. 
 Hypothesis 2, however, does receive support in this model, as the polarization 
variable has both a statistically and substantively significant effect on SSM bans.  
While 1994 is not an absolute marker of national partisan polarization, it was a 
monumental year in the development of partisan rancor at the national level.  That a 
polarized era led to a rapid diffusion of SSM bans that had previously been a 
relatively rare occurrence should not be surprising, given my overall theory.  The 





Table 3.2 Partisan Diffusion of Same-Sex Marriage Bans 
        
Variables Adopt P 
Predicted 
Effect 
    





















































    Log Likelihood -77.318 
  Pseudo R2 0.457 
  Observations 1,294     
Standard errors in parentheses 




persisted two decades later.  There is almost no expectation that a Republican 
controlled state would, in 2014, legislatively adopt SSM, nor would a Democratic  
state ban it.  While legislative action is not the only way to legalize or ban SSM in 
states, it is the clearest signal for partisan diffusion.   
 Overall, we see that partisanship at the state level does have some effect on 
SSM policy diffusion, though the effects are not as statistically or substantively 
significant as my hypotheses expected..  The descriptive analysis shows a clear trend: 
partisanship at the state level is of great importance to the passage of SSM legislation, 
and more states consider passing such legislation during times of high partisan 
polarization.  What is necessary, however, is to acknowledge the relative newness of 
SSM adoptions (in particular), and the somewhat idiosyncratic nature of legislative 
SSM bans.  Future research, then, would be well-served by taking the rapidity of 




  This chapter provides insight into the ways that partisan polarization affects 
policy diffusion and a starting point to understand the specific case of SSM. SSM 
policy is, in 2014, one of the most hotly debated topics in American politics.  While 
we have seen that public opinion has shifted regarding gay rights nationwide, there 
are still fierce battles around SSM in states and in courts across the country.  There is 
an explicitly partisan dimension to the states that have chosen to adopt SSM policy in 
the last decade, and there is little reason to believe that this will not continue to be the 




religious, or political stake in the future of SSM policy, both for and against, and is 
such ripe for continued study.  The dynamics of SSM diffusion are clearly quite 
complex, but this chapter begins to provide answers concerning what drives SSM 
diffusion. 
 Chapter 2 analyzed the foundations of my theory of partisan policy diffusion.  
This chapter looked at one example of a policy that could be considered explicitly 
partisan.  Chapter 4 will delve into right to work policy, and examine it from a 
slightly different angle than SSM.  Indeed, right to work has both economic and 
political concerns, which can be viewed separately or linked. While it differs from 
SSM policy in key ways, it is also a politically contentious issue on which there is 
little agreement among parties.  Chapter 4, then, provides another angle on the impact 


























Chapter 4: Right to Work and Partisan Policy Diffusion 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to make or enter into any 
agreement, either oral or in writing, by the terms of which any employee of such 
person, firm or corporation, or any person about to enter the employ of such person, 
firm or corporation, as a condition for continuing or obtaining such employment, shall 
be required not to become or continue a member of any labor organization, or shall be 
required to become or continue a member of any labor organization. 
 
Title 53 Labor and Industrial Relations, Chapter 613 Employment Practices 
Nevada State Code, Enacted 1911, Amended 1967 
 
 
§ 40.1-58. Policy of article. -- It is hereby declared to be the public policy of Virginia 
that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of 
membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization. (Enacted 
1947; amended 1970.) 
 
Article 3, Virginia State Code, Enacted 1947, Amended 1970 
§ 41-7-10. Denial of right to work for membership or nonmembership in labor 
organization declared to be against public policy.  
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this State that the right of persons to 
work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in 
any labor union or labor organization. 
Title 41, Chapter 7 
South Carolina State Code, Enacted 1954 
 
 
Agreements between employer and union; prohibitions; court jurisdiction; 
violation; penalty; civil action; appropriation. 
Sec. 14. 
(1) An individual shall not be required as a condition of obtaining or continuing 
employment to do any of the following: 
(a) Refrain or resign from membership in, voluntary affiliation with, or voluntary 
financial support of a labor organization. 




(c) Pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges or expenses of any kind or 
amount or provide anything of value to a labor organization. 
(d) Pay to any charitable organization or third party an amount that is in lieu of, 
equivalent to, or any portion of dues, fees, assessments, or other charges or expenses 
required of members of or employees represented by a labor organization.  
Section 423.14, Michigan State Code, Enacted 2012 
 
Organized labor represents one of the more significant social movements in 
American history.  The labor movement was able to change the paradigm for working 
Americans by advocating (and agitating) for 40-hour work weeks, increased safety on 
the job, and in general increasing the power of workers.  Of course, there is also little 
doubt that labor has made serious missteps in its history, notably with ties to 
organized crime, and has come under fire in recent years for its inflexibility, 
perceived or otherwise, in terms of re-working contracts and pension plans.  Many 
blame the influence of unions for creating untenable economic situations for 
manufacturers, and resulting outsourcing of jobs and increased importation of 
manufactured goods, as well as putting unionized industries at a disadvantage.   
 Of course, the dispute between labor and management is as old as capitalism, 
and has been a major part of American public policy for the better part of a century.  
While unions existed prior to the New Deal, President Franklin Roosevelt pushed to 
make labor reform a central part of the New Deal.  The National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935 (also known as the Wagner Act) was a key plank of FDR’s economic agenda.  
It guaranteed the rights of workers to organize, collectively bargain, and strike 
(Skopcal, Finegold, and Goldfield, 1990; Katznelson, 2013).  Of course, this was met 




years later, those groups would push back against the New Deal reforms in the form 
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, or Taft-Hartley Act, that 
significantly restricted the gains that the unions had achieved under FDR.
18
  In effect, 
Taft-Hartley signified a shift away from the bargaining advantages unions had 
enjoyed to a system in which the employer had a good deal more power.  The 
introduction to the Act itself makes this fairly explicit. 
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of 
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers 
in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful 
procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights 
of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations 
with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and 
proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect 
commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of 




Taft-Hartley rolled back quite a few of the provisions the Wagner Act had 
guaranteed, specifically relating to the ability for unions to strike and also outlawing 
closed shops.  It is the closed shop provision that is of particular interest to this 
analysis.  A closed shop was an agreement amongst an employer and a union that the 
employer hire only union employees; essentially, it guaranteed that all workers in a 
particular business would be part of the bargaining unit.  Eliminating the closed shop 
did not end the ability for unions to collectively bargain, but did allow more leeway 
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  President Truman vetoed the legislation, but the veto was overridden.  As part of his reasoning for 
vetoing the bill, Truman said, “I would have signed a bill with some doubtful features if, taken as a  
whole, it had been a good bill. But the Taft-Hartley bill is a shocking piece of legislation. It is unfair to 
the working people of this country. It clearly abuses the right, which millions of our citizens now 
enjoy, to join together and bargain with their employers for fair wages and fair working conditions. 
Under no circumstances could I have signed this bill.”  
Source: Miller Center, University of Virginia, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3344 
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for employers to hire workers and allowed those workers to be exempt from paying 
union dues.   
This chapter focuses on one of the most significant effects of Taft-Hartley: 
right to work (RTW) legislation in states.  RTW is a simple concept: While unions 
can exist in any workplace, no employee must be compelled to join the union.  While 
this seemingly duplicated Taft-Hartley’s provisions, it is actually a feature of the bill.  
The federal legislation allowed for states to do away with “agency fees.”  Under Taft-
Hartley, employees in a union shop had to pay union dues, but only those dues that 
went directly to the costs of collective bargaining.  Under RTW, any employee has 
the right to pay no union dues while still being covered by the union contract.  Of 
course, the intended effect of these laws is clearly to limit union workplaces in a 
given state (Jacobs and Dixon, 2006; Milkman, 2013).  If a state believes union 
workplaces hinder job growth or a state’s ability to attract industry, RTW is an 
attractive alternative.  From a labor perspective, why form a union with all its 
associated costs and not have the ability to compel workers to join that union?  While 
unions certainly exist in many RTW states, there is little doubt that one of the main 
goals of RTW legislation is to diminish the ability of unions to impact the workplace 
(Ellwood and Fine, 1987; Canack and Miller, 1989; Reynolds et al, 1997; Dixon, 
2008).  
The Taft-Hartley reforms had an immediate impact:  Within eleven years, 18 
states had RTW laws on their books.
20
  While RTW laws were created across the 
country, there was a clear geographic component in that nearly every state in the 
                                                 
20
 Texas, Arkansas, Florida, Nebraska, and South Dakota had all passed RTW legislation prior to 




Deep South had passed a RTW law by 1958.  Indeed, if one were to look at RTW’s 
early history, one could easily come to the conclusion that it is a classic case of 
geographic diffusion.  This chapter, however, will examine this claim and look at 
RTW from both a geographic and partisan perspective.  There is little doubt that the 
politics of the labor movement are calcified by partisanship.  As a general rule, unions 
are seen as inherently supportive of the Democratic Party while having an adversarial 
relationship with Republicans.  Greg Mourad, of the National Right to Work 
Committee (NRWC), spoke to me about this issue. 
Historically, we used to have a very small handful of Democrat supporters, 
now there are none, and the ones that did tend to become Republicans.  At the 
moment, I can’t think of any Democrat in Congress who would be considered 
a supporter or even an unknown.  The unions pretty thoroughly control the 
Democrat Party on our issues.  I understand on some other conservative issues 
there are pro-life Democrats, there are pro-gun Democrats, but on the RTW 
issue it is very rare these days to find a pro-RTW Democrat.  The 
consequences of the Democrat primaries are just too severe in terms of what 
the unions will do to them. 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on RTW legislation and 
examines the extent to which RTW legislation followed a pattern of partisan policy 
diffusion.  It includes a recent case study of Michigan’s passage of the legislation and 
delve into the issues surrounding Michigan’s adoption of RTW and the political and 
economic arguments made both for and against it.  Finally, as in Chapter 4, I present 









Literature Review  
 RTW laws have been in effect even before the Taft-Hartley provisions (and 
subsequent state actions) in the 1940’s.  Nevada had legislation that allowed for 
workers to opt out of joining a union as early as 1911.  There are, ostensibly, two 
rationales for creating RTW laws.  First, states argue that RTW will increase job 
creation and attract new industry to a state.  If employers have to deal with less 
powerful unions than they might have otherwise, the argument goes, a state will be 
more attractive in terms of its business climate.  Secondly, and related, RTW limits 
the bargaining power of unions.  It is this second claim that creates much of the 
political backlash to RTW; unions and employers see RTW as dangerous and 
necessary, respectively, and wage (often) public battles around the issue (Moore, 
1998).  Indeed, business interests widely view RTW legislation as a powerful weapon 
to mitigate union influence (Reynolds et al, 1997).  
 While there has never been true harmony between management and unions in 
United States history, the World War II consensus that existed began to crumble, not 
least as a result of Taft-Hartley and the wave of state RTW legislation that followed 
in its wake.  Many states became invested in the labor/management dispute, often 
siding with employers (Jacobs, 1978; Jacobs and Dixon, 2006).  With the at least 
perceived benefits of creating RTW legislation, this shift makes sense.  Given that 
there was a dramatic push in Congress to roll back the labor movement by passing the 
Taft-Hartley Act over a presidential veto, states may have felt emboldened to create 
RTW legislation.  In the case of early RTW legislation, then, it is likely that 




policy.  In the decades since, however, there has been little done on this issue at the 
federal level.  While there has been a great deal of labor policy created by Congress, 
RTW is now firmly in the hands of state legislatures. 
Much of the research on RTW legislation focuses on the economic impact of 
the legislation on states.  One of the main arguments in favor of RTW is that states 
will see economic growth and will be able to attract industries that were historically 
unionized.  While this an empirical claim, the evidence for this argument in the 
literature is mixed.  Moore (1998) argues that there are positive benefits of RTW laws 
in of state industrial development (i.e. manufacturing), but that these effects are 
relatively short lived.  Essentially, RTW laws help states attract new businesses in the 
aftermath of passing the legislation, but that effect diminishes over time.   
Of course, RTW is not meant only to attract new business, but to ensure that 
existing businesses have fewer restraints in terms of union organizing.  Ellwood and 
Fine (1987) show that, indeed, RTW has a dramatic effect on union organizing.  In 
RTW states, they found that organizing decreased by nearly 50% in the five years 
after states passed RTW, and that the decrease steadily continued over time.  Other, 
studies found similar effects (Davis and Huston, 1995; Holmes, 1998; Hogler, et al, 
2004; Stevans, 2009).  This expanded and refuted earlier scholarly work on RTW, 
which painted a mixed picture in terms of how much RTW benefitted the economy of 
a given state.  Lumsden and Peterson (1975) argued that the impetus for state 
adoption was actually due to the demographics of the state itself; that is, workers with 




that the impact of the law itself was actually relatively low, but that unionism itself 
was less desirable to the workers in states that had adopted the legislation.   
Weber and Shaffer (1972) also found that public opinion was predictive of 
whether states had pursued RTW legislation, and argued that scholars should look 
more seriously at the ways in which politics, rather than simply socio-economic need, 
affect policymaking on non-revenue policies.  Interestingly, interest group activity 
was also of importance, though largely to discourage RTW from being enacted.  The 
AFL-CIO, still a powerful organization in its own right, exerted quite a bit more 
influence in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, which may account for this particular 
finding.  Of course, unions are still a powerful force, particularly in Democratic 
politics.  While there is little doubt that the labor movement’s influence has declined 
over time, it is still the case that Democrats see labor as an important base of support.  
Highly unionized states and congressional districts elect Democrats at a much higher 
rate than Republicans, despite union membership declining across the country 
(Francia, 2006).  In terms of policy, however, labor has had less success in pushing 
back against more conservative leaning legislation like RTW.  As we will see, this is 
evident in the recent RTW legislative fights in Indiana and Michigan. 
While there is some evidence to suggest that RTW encourages business 
growth, there is scholarly resistance to this idea as well.  Moore and Newman (1985) 
argue that the effects of RTW are more symbolic than substantive; states attempt to 
appear business-friendly by passing the legislation, but there is no guarantee that 
industry will necessarily stay in or relocate to such a state.  Additionally, the early 




garnered support.  Kalenkoskie and Lacombe (2006) argue that, while there may be 
some small effect of RTW in terms of manufacturing job creation, the effect is almost 
insignificant once omitted variable such as geography, state public opinion, and 
natural resources are taken into account.   
 While the effect of RTW on creating new jobs is somewhat difficult to 
discern, there is no difficulty in determining the impact of RTW on unions, both in 
terms of the number of workers represented by unions and wage differences.  The 
“free rider” problem that was discussed by Olson (1965) in reference to collective 
action problems is on full-display in RTW states.  Workers in these states have the 
choice of whether to join a union, but are covered by the union contract regardless.  
The wages of non-union workers are consistently lower than those covered by union 
contracts, and workers are able to reap the benefits of union contracts without paying 
the associated costs (Sobel, 1995; Schumacher, 1999).   
With the problem of free-riders, the incentives for unions to form are reduced.  
Bargaining for contract concessions, better pensions, etc. is considerably more 
difficult if a good proportion of employees are not invested in the union itself.  Of 
course, with unions less and less likely to form in states that allow RTW, there is also 
the adverse problem for potential free riders in that there will be no union to free ride 
on.  While union membership and wage structure are not the focus of this analysis, it 
is important to understanding the impetus behind RTW legislation in general.  Much 
of the research on the impact of RTW on wages and unionization rates, however, is 




such as existing wage levels and rates of unionization, matter in terms of 
understanding the effects of RTW (Moore, 1980; Reed, 2003).   
This analysis is interested both in the economic impacts of RTW, which are 
murky, and the political impetus for crafting RTW, which is less so.  In the next 
section, I look at RTW policy diffusion from a theoretical standpoint, and argue that 
the policy has elements of both geographic and partisan diffusion, and should be 
considered as a hybrid of the two.  Hybrid legislation is an interesting challenge when 
studying policy diffusion.  RTW is a policy with both partisan and geographic 
connotations.  It is much more attractive to Republican-controlled states, due to the 
level of influence labor exerts on the Democratic Party, but also has an economic 
component that can stretch across state geographic boundaries.  States without RTW 
but with neighbors who have adopted RTW can be portrayed as anti-business, 




 In Chapter 3, I introduced same-sex marriage as a policy that has a clear 
partisan component.  The parties have staked out clear positions on the issue and 
there is a great deal of partisan intensity surrounding it.  RTW has some similar 
partisan dynamics, but also deals with economic and geographic issues are absent 
when states are looking to enact SSM legislation.  While there may be fringe 
economic concerns with SSM (tax incentives, for example), the thrust of that policy is 
not economic.  RTW, however, has a clear economic component.  Regardless of the 




arguments for adopting the legislation is economic.  The basic argument is this: If a 
neighboring state has a RTW law on the books, companies are more willing to locate 
or stay there because they will not have to grapple (as much) with employees 
attempting to organize.  This is, without question, a potentially powerful concern.  If 
states wish to maximize job creation and create a “pro-business” atmosphere, this 
type of argument could be quite persuasive. 
 There is also some evidence that companies attempt to put economic pressure 
on non-RTW states to adopt the policy.  Rao et al (2011) show that Wal-Mart, the 
largest retailer in the country, strategically places new stores on the border of RTW 
states to entice non-RTW states to adopt the legislation.  With the huge financial pull 
of a company like Wal-Mart, states at least need to consider whether their policies are 
conducive to attracting that type of business.  Of course, it is worth noting that Wal-
Mart is routinely seen as one of the more militant retailers in the country in terms of 
its negative stance towards unions, so it is possible that looking at an employer like 
that specifically may not generalizable.  Again, however, the perception that states 
have about the economic impact of RTW, even if that perception is not entirely 
correct, could lead them to adopt the policy in order to “keep up” with its neighbors.   
 RTW adoption, from a standpoint of time, is a fairly skewed event.  Most 
states that currently have the law adopted it within ten years (on either end) of Taft-
Hartley becoming law.  Indeed, since the late 1950’s, the policy has diffused quite 
slowly.  Additionally, the partisan dynamics of RTW have been fluid.  In the 1940’s 
through 1960’s, of course, most of the South was dominated by the Democratic Party.  




platform, which included RTW at the state level.  Figure 4.1 shows a map of RTW 
adoption with state partisan control as it was when the policy was adopted.
21
  Blue 
states are Democratically controlled, red states are Republican controlled, and purple 
states are divided control. 
 
Figure 4.1: Right to Work States by Partisanship. 1943-2010 
 
Simply at first glance, there is a clear partisan and geographic pattern of RTW 
diffusion.  Figure 4.1 does not account for time, but is presented to underscore the 
changing dynamics of RTW legislation.  Every state in the Deep South, when it 
adopted RTW, was controlled by a Democratic state legislature.  Meanwhile, every 
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 In terms of time, state adoption of RTW is as follows, by year. 
1943: Texas; 1944: Arkansas, Florida; 1946: Arizona, Nebraska, South Dakota 
1947: Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia; 1948: North Dakota; 1952: Nevada 
1953: Alabama; 1954: Mississippi, South Carolina; 1958: Kansas; 1963: Wyoming; 1976: Louisiana; 




state outside of the Deep South was controlled either by a Republican legislature or 
had divided government, other than Arizona.  Of course, the Dixiecrats that 
dominated the South in the years after World War II are a far cry from the current 
Democratic Party.  The last Democratic state to adopt RTW was Louisiana in 1976, 
and Democrats have clearly changed their stance on the issue.  So, while obviously 
we cannot know if diffusion would have occurred similarly if the South had been 
solidly Republican in 1940’s and 1950’s, it is also important to note that the partisan 
diffusion that occurred early is a bit different than what we would think of as 
Democratic policy today. 
 Of course, there is also little doubt that RTW has a partisan component today.  
Michigan State Representative Doug Geiss, a Democrat, succinctly explained his 
view on RTW. 
It’s an extremely partisan issue, and it’s a direct attack on Democratic 
supporters. 
 
 Michigan Democrats were highly opposed to RTW creation in their state, as 
we will see below, and painted it as primarily a partisan issue being exploited by 
Republicans.  On the other hand, Republicans like State Representative Jerry Torr of 
Indiana saw Democratic opposition to the legislation as a consequence of the labor 
movement’s clear identification with the Democratic Party. 
It’s interesting; the issue was extremely partisan in Indiana.  There were a 
couple of Republicans that voted against it because they serve in heavily 
unionized areas, but of course all the Democrats opposed it.  There’s a very 





While Republicans who support the legislation obviously have legitimate reasons to 
couch RTW legislation in terms of its economic benefits for a state, it is also clear 
that both parties see RTW as a partisan battle.  While the influence of unions has 
waxed and waned over time (mostly waned), there is no doubt that the labor 
movement is closely associated with the Democratic Party, in the same way that big 
business is usually associated with Republicans, though not to the same extent.  
Indeed, unions generally target Democrats, and particularly Democrats who work 
directly on the issues that are associated with labor (Endersby and Munger, 1995).  
Figure 4.2 shows the amount of money that the labor movement as a whole has 
donated to each political party since 1990.  The gulf between Democrats and 
Republicans is clear. 
In every election cycle, contributions to Democrats have dwarfed 
contributions to Republicans.  Even in 2006, when labor donated $8.3 million to 
Republican candidates (the most in this time frame), Democrats received $58.3 












Figure 4.2: Labor Contributions to Political Parties, 1990-2012 
 
 
Source: The Center for Responsive Politics, Opensecrets.org 
 
  
On the other side of spectrum, business interests are generally seen as more 
closely tied to Republicans.  Figure 4.3 displays the contributions of the business 
sector (including manufacturing, retail, industry, etc.) to Democrats and Republicans.  
While we can see that the relative difference between contributions to the parties are 
much lower than for labor contributions (with Democrats actually receiving more 
from business in the 2008 election cycle, it is still clear that business generally favors 


































Figure 4.3: Business Sector Contributions to Political Parties, 1990-2012 
 
Source: The Center for Responsive Politics, Opensecrets.org 
 
The splits in Figure 4.2 make a good deal of sense.  While the labor movement is 
certainly predicated on economics, it is also political.  Not all business interests, on 
the other hand, have a distinct political ideology.  It makes sense that, given a diverse 
array of industries, Democrats will also receive contributions from the business 
sector.  It is clear, however, that business contributes a massive sum of money to the 
Republican Party. 
 While the figures above relate to national level candidates, they are meant to 
illustrate that the two sides of the RTW issue, business and labor, are fairly distinct in 
terms of their political allies.  RTW is an economic concern, to be sure, but it is also a 
political football that can be used for partisan reasons.  There is also a considerable 
literature on the ways in which interest groups affect policy, particularly in a climate 
where interest groups are becoming more partisan (Haider-Markel, 1999; Brunell, 





























much of the research in this area focuses on national politics as opposed to state work, 
this focus is important to my analysis.  If it is the case that labor and business are 
interests are attempting to influence Congress, either by directly donating to 
campaigns or by the cumulative effect of more members of their preferred party, they 
are also likely to want policy outcomes.   
Of course, there are any number of policies that labor or business would want.  
The issue in terms of RTW, however, is that there is nothing imminent at the national 
level in terms of creating a nationwide RTW law.  Greg Mourad, while hoping for 
such a law, also argues that RTW advocates currently focus on state victories. 
For us, state politics drives national politics.  Places where we are active at the 
state level, we have raised the profile of the issue significantly in that state and 
that tends to have an impact on where the federal candidates are.  Candidates 
for Congress in places we are actively pushing a state RTW law have a need 
to take a stand on the issue as well and makes it harder for them to ignore the 
issue.  We find it easier to get support from politicians in non RTW states 
where we are trying to pass a RTW versus non RTW where we’re not.   
 
 This analysis argues that there is a link between federal inaction and state 
policymaking, and Mourad makes it clear that the two are certainly connected.  While 
it is not necessarily the case that any policy enacted at the state level and then 
diffused to other similarly partisan states has to be a prelude to national action, the 
key point is that states are forced to act when Congress is unable to do so.  While 
RTW is not solely a partisan issue, it has a clear partisan component.  It is not a 
morality policy in the same way as SSM, but it is a policy with relatively simple 
partisan explanations.  From a Republican standpoint, RTW helps create jobs and 
frees workers from the burdens of being force to join a union.  From a Democratic 




and drives down wages and business standards.  While both of these explanations 
have some level of truth, the reason the policy can be considered partisan is that the 
policy itself is rather simple.  Much like morality policy, most citizens can at least 
understand the implications of RTW, even if their basis for understanding those 
implications is flawed.  It is not highly technical, but RTW does have more technical 
aspects than something like SSM. 
 Overall, then, we would expect that both partisanship and geography have 
some effect on RTW diffusion.  In the next section, I look at Michigan’s passage of 
RTW legislation in 2012, and examine the partisan and economic tensions that led to 
its passage, as well as Indiana’s.  With the states in close geographic proximity and 
passing the legislation months apart, Michigan was a particularly compelling case to 
delve into a state’s motivation for adopting RTW and how partisan polarization has 
affected policy diffusion. 
 
Case Study: Michigan and Right to Work 
Of the states associated with the labor movement in America, Michigan is 
historically one of the most influential.  As Democratic State Senator Hoon-Yung 
Hopgood told me, 
To understand how RTW is a controversial issue in many respects in 
Michigan, we’re the birthplace of the modern labor movement. When you 
have a lot of history around people organizing for worker rights, and this goes 
back to the auto industry and other industries in Michigan.  The auto industry 
is the bedrock, and has carried Michigan over many decades.  We credit the 
labor movement and unions in Michigan for establishing a broad middle class.  
 
 Michigan has been a fulcrum union intensity for decades, and was at the forefront of 




in Flint won a sit-down strike against General Motors, striking a major blow in the 
fight to unionize America’s autoworkers.  The strike itself was controversial.  The 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) was considerably less militant than the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), to which the autoworkers belonged, and 
many in the labor movement itself were uncomfortable with the tactics utilized to air 
the workers’ grievances (Fine, 1966; Pope, 2006).   
The ability to win concessions, regardless of tactics, was a hugely important 
step in changing the worker-management relationship in the auto industry in 
Michigan.  The sit down strike, and subsequent recognition of the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) as an important cog in the American labor movement led to 
Michigan’s standing as one of the state leaders in terms of unionization.  Indeed, 
Michigan workers have consistently unionized at a higher rate than the rest of the 
United States, and the United Auto Workers (founded and housed in Detroit) has long 
been a political and economic force in the state and nationally.
22
   
 Of course, labor unions have struggled mightily over the past several decades, 
with the nadir of union power and influence coming in 2013.  In 2013, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that unionized workers made up just 11.3% of the 
private workforce in America, the lowest total in 97 years.
23
  The BLS attributed this 
to changing employment patterns as well as state action that focused on limiting 
union membership in 2012.  Michigan was one of these states.  This, while surprising 
given Michigan’s history of labor activism and power, should not have come as a 
complete shock to anyone following the labor movement closely. The financial crisis 
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 Greenhouse, Steven.  “Share of the Workforce in a Union Falls to 97-Year Low, 11.3%.”  The New 




of 2008 had a dramatic impact on unionized workers in Michigan.   General Motors, 
Ford, and Chrysler were all bailed out with federal money, and there was a great 
amount of pressure on the autoworkers in particular to scale back their pension plans, 
compensation, and benefits.  Even after the unions were forced to make concessions 
to Detroit and thousands of their members lost their jobs or pensions, however, 
Michigan workers remained unionized at a high rate compared to the national 
average.  The current picture of the labor movement in Michigan, though, has become 
quite grim for labor supporters.  In 2005, over 20% of Michigan’s workers were 
members of a union.  In 2012, that number had declined to just over 15%.  Even more 
striking, in 1990 more than 25% of Michigan workers were unionized, a drop of 
nearly ten percentage points in just two decades. 
 While Senator Hopgood’s argument that Michigan’s middle class relied 
heavily on unions in the past may have been true, it is clear that this reality has shifted 
dramatically.  Perhaps not coincidentally, as unions have declined in membership, 
Republicans have begun to exert much more influence and control over Michigan 
politics.  After decades of primarily Democratic control, both in the state legislature 
and the governor’s mansion, the Republican Party has become the dominant force in 
Michigan state politics.   
 This Republican resurgence came to a head in 2010.  That November, Rick 
Snyder, a Republican and former businessman, won the race for governor after two 
terms for Jennifer Granholm, a Democrat.  Far more dramatically, the Republican 
Party won 21 seats in the Michigan House to wrest the majority from the Democrats, 




House seats in 2012, the stage was set for a sea change in policy, particularly 
regarding organized labor. 
 Unions and their supporters recognized that this change might be coming.  
Indiana passed RTW in February 2012, and there had been attempts by Republican 
governors in Wisconsin and Ohio to limit collective bargaining for public sector 
unions.  Organized labor, in an attempt to ensure Michigan would avoid this route, 
pushed a state referendum that would protect collective bargaining rights in the state’s 
constitution.  The measure, however, was defeated at the ballot box by a 58 to 42 
percent margin.
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  While, given the electoral climate, one can certainly question the 
wisdom of urging such a fight, the repudiation of the measure sent a signal to 
policymakers on both sides of the aisle.  It was clear, in late 2012, that organized 
labor in Michigan was on its heels.  Indeed, as Senator Hopgood explains, the time 
was right for the new Republican majority to press its advantage on collective 
bargaining issues. 
There was some speculation that RTW may be on the governor’s agenda, but 
he consistently said it was not on his agenda and he called it “too divisive.”  
He said, “It doesn’t bring people together, it doesn’t help move us forward.”  
Meanwhile, members of the legislature introduced different versions of RTW, 
including ones that said there would be RTW zones and limited physical 
spaces where you would have RTW and all this, but nothing ever moved 
forward... .  The governor continued to say RTW was not on his agenda, we 
get to the lame-duck session in December, and at the last possible moment he 
switched his position.  So, from there, the legislation moved very quickly, in 
the quickest amount of time that it could, through the legislature and to the 
governor’s desk. 
 
Clearly, Hopgood’s assessed the situation from a partisan perspective.  The 
Democrats who spoke with me were incensed at the fact that Snyder seemingly 
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indicated RTW was not a priority, and then supported the bill during a lame duck 
session.  Regardless of partisan concerns, however, it is the case that less than a 
month later after the election and the pro-collective bargaining ballot initiative fight, 
Snyder and the Republican majority in the legislature put the bill up for a vote.  The 
sudden spike in interest left Democrats scrambling to attempt to defeat the measure.  
Supporters and opponents flocked to the Capitol building, with opponents primarily 
mobilized by organized labor.  Inside the Michigan House, many Democrats were 
concerned about the process of the vote.  Democratic Representative Doug Geiss, one 
of the main opponents of the legislation, made his displeasure with the vote clear 
when he spoke with me. 
It was rammed through the legislature, so it did not have any committee 
hearings in either the House or the Senate.  Within about two legislative days 
it was pushed through the House... [There was] limited debate, it did not 
follow the normal process.  They didn’t want to have any hearings, didn’t 
want to have any delay, and they circumvented the entire legislative process. 
In this case, I think many felt it was retaliation for the failed proposal on the 
ballot to block such attempts.  Many felt it was retaliation from the 
Republican majority. 
 
The opponents of the bill were largely convinced that, in fact, RTW in 
Michigan was as much about political retaliation as it was about producing economic 
gains for the state.  This dispute is at the heart of the RTW issue in terms of policy 
diffusion.  Opponents of RTW legislation often cast the issue in terms of partisanship, 
an attack on unions that have long been the base of support for the Democratic Party.  
Supporters, however, are often able to tout both the tangible policy benefits of RTW 
as well as their ideological stance on unionism in general. Republican Representative 





I firmly believe that all people should have the right to choose whether or not 
to join a group.  Also, the SEIU (Service Employees International Union) 
pushed a ballot drive on many labor issues in Michigan in the last election 
cycle.  Those were defeated, and I was for labor freedom regardless, but it put 
labor issues in the limelight and ripe for policy debate. 
 
Labor freedom, from the point of view of a proponent of RTW, focuses on the 
ability of a worker to opt out of joining a union or paying union dues.  As we have 
seen, this not only makes unionizing a workplace less likely, but also potentially frees 
employers from having to collectively bargain with their workforce. Shirkey makes 
the case that RTW is primarily about worker choice, specifically the choice to form a 
union, but also makes it clear that organized labor’s campaign to enshrine collective 
bargaining rights in the Michigan constitution was a major factor in bringing about 
RTW.  This is not particularly surprising on either side.  Given the focus on labor 
rights, and collective bargaining specifically, in many states surrounding Michigan, 
organized labor certainly felt pressure to stem the tide and cement collective 
bargaining rights in a state with a long and proud history of labor activism.  Once the 
ballot measure failed, however, there was a clear window of opportunity for 
supporters of RTW.  Recall from Chapter 4 that policy entrepreneurs utilized a 
window of opportunity to pass SSM legislation in Maryland.   Michigan’s passage of 
RTW relied on similar effort from groups with a partisan interest in RTW legislation.  
I spoke with Greg Mourad, Director of Legislation at the National Right to Work 
Committee (NRWC), who explained the process behind Michigan’s decision to take 
up the legislation in 2012. 
 
The unions had put a proposition on the ballot to amend Michigan’s 
constitution to say that it could never become a RTW state.  The voters of 




What that did was send a message to all the politicians in Michigan that 
supporting RTW was the safe thing to do electorally.  And so we saw a very 
sudden spike in interest from some of the legislators and the governor.   
 
 The NRWC, of course, is committed to passing RTW at both the state and 
national level, and has been involved in nearly all the RTW fights over the past 
decade.   As of this writing, there is little reason to believe that a national RTW law is 
forthcoming, but Mourad made it clear when speaking to me that his organization will 
continue to press for more legislation at the state level that is similar to what was 
accomplished in Michigan.   
In terms of passage of a national law in the near future, I don’t see that 
coming.  But what we’d like to see and what we’re asking for is a roll-call 
vote in both chambers on a RTW law, and that would allow us to start holding 
politicians accountable.  
 
Mourad’s description of where his organization expects to be active is quite 
interesting, primarily given the geographic differences of those states, but also their 
political makeup as well.  Pennsylvania, for example, is similar to Michigan in terms 
of partisan loyalty, and is usually considered a swing states.  I described Michigan’s 
passage of RTW in 2012 as supporters taking advantage of a window of opportunity, 
which may certainly have been the case in that particular situation.  That being said, 
however, it is also possible that there has been an overall shift in the direction of 
RTW legislation.  This analysis looks at the history of RTW and the impact of 
partisan polarization on the policy.  Future research, however, will be well served by 
determining whether the policy will diffuse even more rapidly than it already has. 
In this climate, then, RTW passage in Michigan is not as shocking as it might 




financial crisis in 2008 and the federal bailout of the Detroit automakers that 
weakened their overall political and economic power, the 2010 election results made 
Michigan a prime target for new RTW legislation.  Additionally, RTW has become a 
fixture for many state legislative debates.  19 states debated new RTW laws or 
strengthening RTW provisions in 2012, and 21 did so in 2013, with a total of 5 states 
passing new or strengthened laws.  From this perspective, then, Michigan’s 
consideration of such a law, while once difficult to imagine, fits into the current trend 
of RTW legislation nationwide. 
  This analysis, of course, is interested in the causes of sate policy diffusion.  
The modal research question in the policy diffusion literature focuses on regional or 
geographic diffusion.  While I dispute that this is always the primary reason for 
policy diffusion, there is a greater case to be made for a policy like RTW than for 
same-sex marriage.  Earlier in this chapter, I make the case that RTW is a hybrid 
policy that has both partisan and geographic interests at play.  Michigan is a 
particularly good test case for this notion.  In February, 2012, neighboring Indiana 
passed a RTW law, less than a year before Michigan’s lame duck session.
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  Indiana 
was the first Upper Midwest state since Iowa (in 1947) to pass a RTW law.  As a 
result, it would certainly be tempting to conclude that Indiana’s geographic proximity 
to Michigan, and the short time frame, had a major impact on Michigan’s 
consideration of RTW legislation.  Those I spoke with, however, offered a mixed 
reaction to the notion that Indiana’s influence was primarily geographic. 
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 In 2013, the law was struck down by an Indiana state court, with Judge John Sedia ruling the 
legislation unconstitutional.  As of this writing the case is pending in the Indiana Supreme Court, but 





I don’t think Indiana’s adoption was terribly important, I don’t think Indiana 
is in any position to steal a bunch of heavy manufacturing jobs.  I think it was 
in many ways a cover story to explain why we need to do this.  This was 
payback for the unions.  I don’t think there’s a real strong economic argument, 
unless your model for economic growth is to pay your workers as little as 




Indiana had already passed this legislation.  In reality it was more a strike 
against the ability for the unions to raise money and support Democrats.  It 
really comes down to dollars and cents, not any type of philosophy that this 




[There was] little primary effect [of Indiana’s passage].  I view this first and 




Geography has an impact only to the extent that geographical region is a 
factor on the economic situation.  For example, Kentucky is now almost 
completely surrounded by RTW states.  That puts more economic pressure on 
the state and anybody looking to be in that part of the country is looking at a 
RTW state across their borders, so that puts more pressure on them.  But we 
don’t look at it, we don’t say that state is almost surrounded therefore we push 
there next.  We say, oh, there’s intense pressure on this state because of its 
geography, but that’s not the determinative factor.  Indiana, when we passed it 
there, was pretty much an island by itself.  We look for places where the 
politics are right and we try. 
 
 It is clear that Indiana’s passage was at least on the minds of the people 
involved in the RTW fight in Michigan, but the extent to which it actually affected 
consideration or voting in Michigan is unclear from my interviews.  There is, 
however, a clear theme of partisanship that pervades most of the comments.  The 
Democratic legislators I spoke with were fairly convinced that RTW was a political 




collective bargaining ballot initiative.  While it seems unlikely that those on the 
Republican side would admit to this if it were true, the perception is certainly that 
economic concerns took a back seat to politics. 
 Less than a year before Michigan surprisingly passed RTW legislation, 
Indiana passed RTW after years of trying and failing to do so.  I spoke with Indiana 
Representative Jerry Torr, who had sponsored the bill for years prior to its 2012 
passage, about the process by which his state adopted the legislation.    
By the time [the Republicans] got the majority back in 2011, RTW did have 
enough momentum going to at least get a committee hearing.  That’s the year 
that the Democrats actually left to deny us a quorum.  Went to Illinois, and 
were holed up in a hotel over there for like six weeks or something, denying 
us a quorum.  Then the next year, in 2012, during the summer the Speaker 
became convinced it was important to the state, so he and the Senate pro temp 
pronounced that it would be a priority for the legislative session.  So, we 
passed it in 2012 and it was signed by the governor on February 1, 2012. 
 
As Rep. Torr explained, Indiana’s passage of RTW was even more dramatic than 
Michigan’s.  While Michigan Democrats argued that Republicans abused the 
legislative process by fast tracking RTW, Indiana’s Democrats took a much more 
aggressive stance against RTW and actually left the state.  One could certainly argue 
that this was largely a stunt, but it was also a clear indication that there was a great 
amount of partisan disagreement on the RTW issue.   
 Michigan Democrats did not go to the same extent, obviously, but there was 
also a good deal of partisan rancor regarding the issue.  Democrats walked off the 
floor of the House during the vote, and protestors were arrested during the debate.
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The legislation passed, however, and Michigan became one of the more surprising 
RTW states in America.  The question for this analysis, of course, is whether policy 






diffusion was at the root of Michigan’s adoption, and whether that diffusion was 
driven by politics or geography.  Torr argued that the issue was about both worker 
freedom and economic security for Indiana, which mirrors most of the pro-RTW 
arguments. 
I always said there were two valid reasons to make Indiana a RTW state, and I 
thought both were equally valid and compelling enough to do it on their own.  
The first was just to provide the freedom for an individual worker to decide if 
he or she wanted to participate in the union, and that individual freedom really 
resonated with the citizens of Indiana.  I also always thought it would help 
bring employers to Indiana, and we’ve seen that that’s been the case.  We 
have anecdotal evidence, we know specifically employers that have said 
“Hey, you weren’t on our radar screens before you were a RTW state, but now 
you are and now we’d like to come to your state.” 
 
 This is the important difference between SSM and RTW.  As we saw in 
Chapter 4, the arguments for SSM adoption are not centered on geography.  There is 
little reason for states to either adopt or ban SSM if neighboring states have done so.  
If Republicans control a state, the Democratic state next-door adopting SSM is likely 
to have no effect on whether the Republican state adopts the policy.  RTW, on the 
other hand, has an undeniable economic component.  In addition to the obvious 
partisan differences surrounding unions and their role in the workforce, there are 
actual economic pressures that come with adopting RTW legislation.  While 
Michigan Democrats downplayed the significance of neighboring Indiana adopting 
the policy, there is little doubt that the economic angle of the policy had at least some 
effect on Michigan. 
 Of course, Michigan did not pass the legislation in a bi-partisan way.  No 
Democrats voted for the bill, in either the House or the Senate, nor did any Democrats 




was passed in both Indiana and Michigan primarily as a result of Republicans 
controlling the state legislatures.  In Michigan, this control came largely as a result of 
the national Republican wave election in 2010.  This is not necessarily surprising, as 
state legislatures that are controlled by the president’s party often lose seats in a 
midterm year (Campbell, 1986).  While many predicted that Republicans would gain 
ground in terms of state legislatures in 2010, not many predicted that the party would 
gain control of twenty-one (Klarner, 2011).  Though it is difficult to directly 
determine how much of an effect the congressional midterm elections had on the 
composition of state legislatures, there is no doubt that high levels of Republican 
voter intensity helped create the Republican wave at the state level.   
 The divide between the parties at the national level, then, likely made the 
conditions for Michigan to pass RTW legislation much more optimal.  Of course, part 
of my theory is that partisan polarization in Congress drives policy-making at the 
state level.  Senator Hopgood argued that, indeed, the polarized politics in 
Washington were a driving force behind Governor Snyder’s about-face on RTW, and 
the adoption of the policy itself. 
I think that there’s a feeling that things are broken in Washington...It seems 
like there are folks like the Tea Party and that whole dynamic, which has 
increased its influence in Michigan politics in the last couple years, I think 
that’s the more interesting dynamic that’s allowed for these conservative 
policies to get through in Michigan.  I think the governor’s being stretched 
between the middle and the far right. 
 
Hopgood recognizes the impact of national interests on state policy decisions, and 
also, interestingly, acknowledges Snyder’s difficult position.  While Snyder was 




conservative interest groups and national policy concerns may have led to Snyder’s 
acceptance of the RTW issue.  From Greg Mourad’s comments to me about the 
NRWC’s activities at the both the state and national level, it seems clear that national 
politics had, at the very least, some influence in Michigan’s decision to become a 
RTW state. 
If it is the case that national politics exerts influence on state legislative 
outcomes, it may also be that national concerns become state concerns as well.  It is 
worth noting that, as in Congress, party control plays a major role in the type of 
legislation that is considered at the state level (Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins, 2011).  
With a newly elected Republican-controlled legislature, along with a relatively 
conservative Republican governor, Michigan was certainly primed to adopt (and 
possibly innovate) highly partisan policy.  While, as I have noted, RTW exhibits 
characteristics of both partisan and geographic policy diffusion, Michigan Democrats 
clearly saw the legislation as partisan in nature.  While disagreeing with RTW on its 
merits, Democrats felt that the policy was adopted primarily as a result of political 
retribution.  There are many laws a legislature could pass that deal with job creation 
or attracting industry, but Michigan (and more to the point, Michigan Republicans) 
chose to adopt RTW legislation that had proven controversial in states across the 
country. 
 It is this final point that is particularly interesting when looking at policy 
diffusion from a partisan perspective.  Recall the discussion from Chapter 1 
concerning the fight in Wisconsin and Ohio over public sector collective bargaining 




that policy exists elsewhere or not.  In terms of diffusion policy, states can see the 
effects of policy on other states and then act with more information than they might 
otherwise have.  If a policy works in a state, it makes sense for a neighboring state, 
with similar demographics and policy needs, to adopt that policy.  While state 
boundaries are real, it is not the case that going from Virginia to Maryland is like 
transitioning to another planet.  Unless, of course, one is concerned about the state’s 
partisan politics.  It is here that partisan diffusion departs from traditional 
explanations of policy diffusion.   
 Michigan legislators had to know that adopting RTW legislation would be 
controversial.  In addition to strong Democratic opposition, Michigan has long been 
identified with union labor.  The fact that Michigan adopted the legislation despite 
these hurdles speaks to both the ability for majority parties to affect policy change in 
the states, and the intensity with which Michigan Republicans wanted the legislation 
to pass.  While they could have chosen any number of policies that their regional 
neighbor had adopted to spur job growth, they decided to adopt one that only one 
“Rust Belt” state (Indiana) had ever adopted.  In the end, then, though the motivations 
for RTW may have been economic, there is no doubt that partisanship played an 
important role as well. 
 
 
Hypotheses and Data 
 
 This analysis is primarily interested in the effects of partisanship on RTW 
legislation.  As we have seen, however, it is also the case that RTW has a geographic 




policy.  My dependent variable measures the adoption of RTW policy.  If a state 
adopted RTW in a given year, the variable is coded as “1” and coded as a “0” if the 
policy was not adopted.  I utilize variables similar to those in Chapter 3, but also add 
a measure of geographic diffusion.
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  This is similar to the partisan diffusion measure, 
with a state year being coded as 1 if a geographic neighbor adopted RTW within two 
years, a 0 if not.  I also include both the number of Republican and Democratic laws, 
as the partisan attachments of RTW have shifted over time. 
 I include a measure of partisan polarization, coded as 0 prior to 1994 and 1 
after as I do in Chapter 3, and it remains an important part of this analysis.  It must be 
noted, however, that much RTW legislation was created during low levels of partisan 
polarization.  So, while it may be the case that partisan polarization did not play a 
large role in the initial creation of RTW policy, it should have an impact on recent 
and future state adoption.  Additionally, as we have seen, RTW in the states was 
given a major boost by federal legislation.  Taft-Hartley was passed over President 
Truman’s veto indicating that, while absolute levels of polarization were low in the 
late 1940’s and early 1950’s, there was some partisan cleavage on the issue.   
In light of the preceding discussion, then, I make three hypotheses regarding 
RTW diffusion. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Partisan proximity will have a positive impact on RTW policy diffusion. 
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 The model presented in this chapter does not utilize the measures of state legislative and citizen 





 Hypothesis 1 deals with the state partisanship aspect of RTW policy diffusion.   
States with similar partisanship that have adopted RTW policy should have a positive 
influence on their partisan neighbors, who will adopt the policy as a result of their 
shared partisanship.  .  I also expect national polarization to affect RTW diffusion. 
 
Hypothesis 2: National polarization will have a positive effect on RTW policy 
diffusion. 
  
 Hypothesis 2 describes the relationship between national partisanship and 
RTW diffusion.  Again, while RTW is a policy that has both geographic and partisan 
components, I expect national polarization to play a role in the policy’s diffusion.  
Similar to the SSM discussion, states will look to create more and more legislation in 
the absence of national policymaking and will be influenced by national polarization 
to adopt partisan policies.  RTW certainly has geographic importance, but it is also a 
policy that has clear partisan cleavages.   
Of course, geography also plays a role in RTW diffusion.  The research on 
RTW suggests that geographic considerations play a role in the RTW debate, as states 
can feel pressure to adopt the policy and make themselves appear more business-
friendly.  When a geographic neighbor has already adopted the policy, this pressure 
mounts.  Hypothesis 3 explains this expectation, with my geographic proximity 





Hypothesis 3:  Geographic proximity will have a positive impact on RTW policy 
diffusion. 
 
 RTW is an interesting policy to study through the lens of partisan diffusion 
because it has distinct geographic and partisan dimensions.  While, in general, this 
analysis is not interested in geographic diffusion per se, it is important to model for 
geography with a policy that may follow the traditional conception of geographic 
diffusion.   Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the adoption of RTW policy in 
states.  In this table, I look at the circumstances under which states adopted RTW.  It 
seems clear that partisanship plays an important role in the diffusion of RTW policy.  
Of the 23 states that have adopted RTW, 14 did so immediately after a partisan 
neighbor passed the policy as well.  The story is reversed for geographic diffusion.  
While there is no doubt that geography matters in terms of RTW diffusion, only 9 
states adopted the policy in the year following their geographic neighbors.  This is 
similar for states that are both partisan and geographic neighbors, as we can see in the 
third column.   
 
Table 4.1: Diffusion of Right to Work Policy 
 
 Geographic Partisan Geography & Partisan 
 Diffuse Not Diffuse Diffuse Not Diffuse Diffuse Not Diffuse 
       
Lottery Adoption 9 14 14 9 8 15 





I also account for time.  The time variable measures the number of years a 
state has been in the dataset.  The states drop out of the data once diffusion has 
occurred because they are no longer “at risk” of adopting the policy (Berry and Berry, 
1990).  This, again, follows the convention in the literature. Time is, it should be 
noted, an interesting part of the diffusion story.  As discussed, diffusion may rely on 
windows of opportunity, and these windows are often only open for a short period of 
time.  As such, the longer a state goes without adopting the policy, ceteris paribus, 
the less likely it is to adopt RTW.  There needs to be some impetus for the policy 
diffuse, which can occur if a new window of opportunity opens, which may be the 
case as of 2014.  With traditionally strong union states like Michigan and Indiana 
passing RTW legislation, it may be the case that a new window has opened and that 
more states could follow in Michigan and Indiana’s footsteps, which would impact 
the expectation I have for time as a factor in diffusion.  I expect time, then, to have a 




My model examines the diffusion of RTW legislation from 1943-2010, 
utilizing a probit estimation.  Table 4.2 shows the results for the partisan diffusion 
model.  In terms of state-level factors, both partisan and geographic proximity have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on RTW diffusion, as well as substantively 
significant predicted effects.  As with SSM diffusion, we can see that partisan 
neighbors adopting RTW has an important impact on adoption.  This makes sense 




however, also positively effects RTW adoption.  This also makes sense, as RTW 
cannot be considered a purely partisan policy.  In this case, as is likely true with many 
policies, one needs to be careful not to understate the impact of variables other than 
partisanship on diffusion.  As I have noted throughout this analysis, I do not believe 
that partisanship and polarization are the only causal mechanisms that create partisan 
policy diffusion, though I do view them as the most important.  Policy diffusion, 
however, is a complex process that can never be fully captured with just one or two 
explanatory variables, and the results of my model show this clearly. 
Interestingly, the number of Republican laws passed has a positive impact on 
RTW adoption.  While many of the early states that adopted RTW were controlled by 
Democrats, the policy diffused quite rapidly.  Over time, the politics shifted and RTW 
became a largely Republican issue, and so more and more Republican states began to 
adopt the policy.  The model, then, largely satisfies Hypotheses 1 and 3. 
In terms of Hypothesis 2, however, this model does not meet my expectations.  
National polarization is not significant in the model, which makes some sense given 
the makeup of RTW data.  Since much of the legislation diffused in the wake of Taft-
Hartley (and during a period of low partisan polarization), this result makes sense in a 
historical context.  This may be changing, however, given recent adoptions in places 
like Michigan and Indiana.  In the current climate, polarization may have a greater 
effect on RTW adoption than it has in the past.  So, while the empirical results 
presented here are not consistent with the notion that polarization has mattered in 
terms of RTW adoption, the qualitative portion of this chapter casts doubt on whether 




Table 4.2: Partisan Diffusion of Right to Work Policy 
        
Independent Variables Adopt P 
Predicted 
Effect 
    





















































    Log Likelihood -49.662 
  Pseudo R2 0.609 
  N 2,135     
Standard errors in parentheses 






 The empirical results presented in this chapter shed light on the causal 
mechanisms of RTW diffusion.  It looks at both partisan and geographic proximity in 
RTW diffusion, and shows that state-level partisanship and geography have a positive 
effect on the diffusion of RTW policy.  On the other hand, the national level results 
are less satisfying.  In the case of RTW, of course, this may be expected.  Indeed, 
with partisan polarization in Congress at relatively low levels during the adoption of 
most RTW policy, it may be the case that national polarization was not important in 
the past. 
 That is not to say, however, that RTW diffusion is not currently affected by 
national politics.  In my discussion of Michigan’s RTW adoption, it was clear from 
the individuals to whom I spoke that national politics played an important role in 
Michigan’s eventually adoption of the process.  This was particularly true in the case 
of national interest groups that sought to influence the outcome in Michigan.  This 
goes to the discussion in Chapter 4 about conflict extension.  RTW is a compelling 
example of conflict extension, though extending from states to Washington, rather 
than the other way around.  Creating RTW policy in states may put pressure on 
national legislators to push for a national RTW law.  Of course, with what would 
certainly be strong Democratic opposition, that law is unlikely to be passed in the 
short term.  In that case, then, states may continue to pass the legislation through the 
partisan diffusion process. 
 Michigan and Indiana were unlikely candidates for RTW legislation, yet each 




engaged in a controversial policy fight nearly ten years after the last state to adopt 
RTW.  There were clearly, especially in Indiana, no real geographic concerns, though 
there was partisanship to consider.  While Democratic states were the harbingers of 
RTW, the issue has shifted to the Republicans.  The study of RTW diffusion, then, 
necessitates a discussion of the partisanship inherent in the issue, and this chapter 
begins that discussion.  By examining Michigan’s adoption of the policy in detail, it 
highlights the changing policy diffusion dynamics that exist even for policies that 
could be considered geographic in nature.  As we have seen throughout this analysis, 
it is crucial to go beyond simply assuming that policies diffuse as a result of 
geography only.  Partisanship at all levels plays an important role.  What is to be 
decided is whether the window of opportunity opened by Michigan and Indiana will 













Chapter 5: Conclusions  
 
Party politics are as important in America today as they have ever been.  The 
rancor and discord present between the parties manifests itself on nearly every major 
issue; indeed, congressional productivity is at a low-water mark in 2014, despite 
major issues facing the nation.  While, not quite so long ago, one of the biggest issues 
in terms of partisanship was that there was no clear choice for the voters, the 
pendulum has swung entirely in the opposite direction.  The lines of distinction 
between Democrats and Republicans have become bright and stark, and compromise 
on nearly any issue has become remarkably difficult to achieve.  In state legislatures 
and in Washington, partisan polarization has become a fact of American political life. 
 
State Policy Diffusion Revisited 
 Rising polarization was the main inspiration for this analysis.  How, in an 
era in which intransigence is the norm rather than the exception, can policy be 
created?  It is not as though policy creation has ever been easy; the policy process 
is complex and difficult to navigate in the best of times.  Charles Lindblom 
recognized this in 1959, at one of the lowest points for partisan polarization in 
American history.  In his seminal work on “muddling through,” Lindblom 
describes two versions of policy creation.  In an ideal world, policymakers would 
have all the information necessary, would outline the steps needed to make the 
policy a reality, and then actually create the policy.  In the second version, also 




settle for hopefully achieving part of their goals.  Indeed, he argues that the first 
approach “assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men 
simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when 
the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is 
always the case.” 
 Lindblom’s explanation for limitations placed on policymakers is both 
interesting and true.  Making policy is difficult.  There are any number of 
constituencies that policymakers must consider, and none of whom will be 
completely satisfied by the result.  Dealing with interest groups, budget concerns, 
electoral concerns, and any of the other demands on policymakers can derail the 
process at any time.  There is a reason why making laws is often equated with making 
sausage, after all.  Add to this extreme partisan polarization, and the process can 
become exponentially harder.  In Lindblom’s time, there was (perhaps) at least an 
expectation that those on the other side of the aisle would be willing to compromise, 
or at least not decide that a policy created by a partisan rival was dead the moment it 
was introduced.  In the hyper-polarized climate in America in 2014, however, this 
expectation is not often met. 
Kristin Jones works as the chief of staff for Maryland’s Speaker of the House, 
and expressed frustration about the lack of federal action on a host of issues, thus 
forcing states to create policy on their own. 
I think [federal inaction] is often part of the conversation.  I go back all 
the way, for instance, access to prescription drugs for seniors.  I mean, 
how often did the feds try to attach a drug benefit to Medicare and 
seem completely incapable of making that happen or bringing it to 
fruition?  The states started getting involved, and we developed our 




for seniors.  And again, these are imperfect solutions because there are 
so many consequences to not having action on the federal level.   
 
Jones’ point about “imperfect solutions” is particularly interesting.  Jones makes it 
clear that Maryland pursued the policy primarily because the federal government had 
tried and failed to do so.  In Maryland, however, frustration is not equally felt, 
depending on an individual’s party affiliation.  In a state dominated by Democratic 
politics, many conservative or Republican viewpoints are underrepresented (if at all).  
Democrats can create nearly any policy they choose, assuming solidarity within the 
caucus, but even Democrats express frustration with the inability for Congress to 
create viable policy. 
 Republicans in a state like Maryland face their own form of frustration, which 
is certainly on a level of magnitude higher than what some Democrats may face.  
Republicans are, in many ways, marginalized in Maryland, in the same way that 
Democrats may feel marginalized in a very conservative or Republican-dominated 
state, and it is important to understand that mindset.  Maryland State Delegate Wade 
Kach spoke with me about how he sees polarization affecting policymaking both in 
Congress and in the states. 
To bring up partisanship and the big problem with it, in both Annapolis and 
Washington, is the polarization...The parties during this period have drawn all 
these super-Democrat [congressional] districts or super-Republican districts, 
and there are about 30 or 35 districts that are competitive.  So you have to be 
super-liberal to win in the Democrat districts or super-conservative to win in 
the Republican districts, so I don’t see much movement, because there are 
some issues on which there is no compromise. 
 
Kach’s last point is of great interest, not only to this analysis but for policy creation in 




impossible.  The question is, does this apply mainly to issues on which there are clear 
partisan divisions, or has polarization becomes so deeply ingrained in the American 
political system that nearly every issue creates unwillingness to compromise.  
 Indeed, on nearly every issue one could find a partisan dimension.  Nearly any 
policy issue will have some sort of environmental impact, or social question, or a 
need to raise or lower revenue, or a call for more regulation.  No matter what the 
issue is, ideological divisions could derail nearly any piece of legislation.  This 
assumes, of course, that polarization truly does permeate every aspect of 
policymaking.  If we look at how Congress has acted over the last decade, we may be 
tempted to believe this is true.  What is important for the future of state policy 
diffusion to research is to begin to examine whether this is the case for state 
policymaking as well. 
 This analysis has sought to understand these dynamics as they relate to state 
policy diffusion.  I argue that national polarization has impacted state polarization, 
primarily through increasing party cohesiveness on many issues, which in turn has an 
impact on how policies diffuse.  In a polarized era, states will look to partisan 
neighbors for innovative policy.  The concept of “neighbors” is important in 
understanding state policy diffusion in general.  Since creating policy is, as we have 
seen, difficult, states necessarily rely on other states for policy inspiration.  
 Of course, this was not always the case.  Not only has polarization not always 
been nearly as high as it  has been in the last two decades, the parties themselves were 
not particularly cohesive.  In the 1950’s, Democrats in Alabama had almost nothing 




labels, at that time, were not nearly as descriptive as they are now.  One could not 
identify what a “Democrat” stood for, because the Democratic Party’s platform 
changed depending on where you happened to be.  Today, if someone identifies as a 
member of a party, their beliefs and policy preferences are likely similar to their 
fellow partisans, and in opposition to the other party.  This dynamic exists in terms of 
state partisanship as well.  While Republican legislators in Mississippi are not going 
to be identical to Republicans in Wyoming, they will almost certainly share core 
beliefs.   
Party labels, then, provide an important shortcut in terms of policy diffusion, 
and gives states informational cues concerning where to look for policy innovation.  
Policy innovation is, in some ways, less desirable than policy adoption.  Coming up 
with a new policy solution, creating that solution, and then getting that solution 
passed is an arduous process.  To avoid going through this is, for state legislators, 
ultimately desirable.  Chapter 2 laid out the difficulties facing state legislators, 
including professionalization levels and part time legislative sessions, so having 
policy templates available is invaluable.  From the perspective of this analysis, policy 
templates do not need to come from nearby states, but rather from fellow partisans. 
 States must deal with the lack of national policymaking and the ways in which 
national issues filter down to the state level.  Chapter 3 discussed conflict extension 
as a basis for same-sex marriage diffusion, in which elite level discourse polarizes 
party identifier attitudes.  This idea can be expanded when we look at the ways in 




that state legislators and activists will become polarized as well.  The more polarized 
state government, the more likely it is that increasingly partisan policies will diffuse.   
 
Further Research 
 This analysis is a first step in understanding the ways partisanship and partisan 
polarization affect state policy diffusion.  It is, of course, an examination of only a 
few policies, but those policies are instructive in terms of the larger work that can 
eventually be accomplished in this field.  When thinking about policies that can be 
affected by partisan polarization at all levels of government, one must indeed think 
broadly.  This analysis looked at three policies in some depth: lottery adoption, same-
sex marriage, and right to work.  These policies, however, cannot give an overall 
picture of how partisan diffusion works.  They are important examples, and provide a 
good baseline for understanding the processes involved in partisan diffusion, but they 
should serve as a starting point. 
 In terms of the overall partisan diffusion project, then, one of the most 
important next steps is to analyze trends for partisan policies.  This may be morality 
policy, like same-sex marriage, or something more complex like voter ID laws.  
Additionally, scholars must grapple with policies that have multiple facets for 
diffusion, such as RTW.  Immigration and environmental policies may be fruitful 
examples of policies that combine partisan considerations with other important 
variables related to diffusion. 
 Legislation, of course, is not the only facet of policy creation that is 




creation also largely depends on partisan polarization.  The rise of hyper-partisan 
interest groups has also been an important cog in the partisan policymaking machine.  
I spoke with interest group staff who made it clear that they are interested in state 
policy and that they understand the impact that partisanship is vital to passing the 
policies they prefer.  The need to understand the impact of partisan political groups is 
vital in understanding how partisan policy diffuses.  With policymaking in Congress 
increasingly difficult, interest groups may begin to focus even more on state 
policymaking.  Additionally, moving beyond studying state legislative action and into 
direct democracy actions like state referenda and ballot initiatives is another 
important concern for partisan policy diffusion research.   
Berry and Berry (1990) make the case that one of the major difficulties in 
studying public policy diffusion is the relatively low number of cases of adoption for 
a given policy.  Most of the time, states do nothing on a given policy.  For something 
like same-sex marriage, for example, states did not even begin to consider adopting 
marriage for same-sex couples until just over a decade ago, and even then most states 
have not adopted the policy.  This does not mean that looking at a policy like SSM 
cannot give us insight into the partisan diffusion process, or that scholars should look 
only at one policy as an example of diffusion.  My overall theory, however, is not 
dependent upon just one or two policies. 
It is also important to continue to utilize qualitative methodology as well.  
Even looking at larger studies in terms of the number of policies considered cannot 
avoid the relative lack of observations inherent in state policy diffusion studies.  




very enlightening, particularly when attempting to understand the underlying 
processes of policy diffusion.  One of the points that I continued coming back to in 
this analysis was the notion of perception; if policy elites have the perception that 
partisan polarization is a problem, it may not matter if polarization actually exerts on 
outsize influence on policy diffusion.  Understanding the motivations of the people 
involved in the policy process is important, because it gives context to the 
quantitative results that political science is particularly adept at achieving.  When 
dealing with issues of small sample size like state policy adoption, however, it is not 
always possible to get a clear view of what is happening at the state level.  In 
continuing this work, I plan to delve more deeply into the mindset of policymakers 




 Understanding the role that partisan polarization plays in American politics is, 
to me, one of the most important endeavors facing political science.  Partisan 
considerations exist in nearly every policy that is considered at any level of 
government.  With an ever-widening gulf between the parties on fundamental beliefs 
as to how government should function, understanding the role that partisanship plays 
in policymaking is vital to understanding the policy process itself.  Perhaps 
Republicans in Wisconsin and Ohio miscalculated the response to ending public 
sector collective bargaining, but Governors Walker and Kasich chose a course of 




issue of a budget shortfall.   Understanding why those states chose to adopt such a 
controversial policy is at the heart of this analysis.   
 While the scholarly understanding of partisan policy diffusion needs to 
continue to grow, this analysis presents a theory for how states decide which policies 
to adopt in an era of high partisan polarization.  It expands upon foundational 
literature and opens up new avenues of scholarship for policy diffusion in general.  





































 This study draws on interviews conducted with state legislators and national 
interest group staffers to help understand the role that state partisanship and national 
polarization play in the policy diffusion process.  These interviews were conducted 
with approval from the University of Maryland’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).  
Information on the approval of these interviews can be obtained from IRB, and the 
project number for this study is 409987-2. 
 
Table A-1: Interviewee Details 
  Interviewee Legislator/IG State/Organization Issue 
 
     Carrie Evans Interest Group Equality Maryland Same-sex Marriage 
 
Doug Geiss Legislator Michigan Right to Work 
 
Hoon-Young Hopgood Legislator Michigan Right to Work 
 
Kristin Jones Legislative Staff Maryland Same-sex Marriage 
 
Wade Kach Legislator Maryland Same-sex Marriage 
 
Greg Mourad Interest Group National RTW Committee Right to Work 
 
Jeremy Pittman Interest Group Human Rights Campaign Same-sex Marriage 
 
Mike Shirkey Legislator Michigan Right to Work 
Jerry Torr Legislator Indiana Right to Work 
          
 
Information on the interviewees is presented in Table A-1.  All the 
interviewees consented to be named in this study.  The interviews were conducted 




email using the same message, changed slightly depending on if they worked for an 
interest group or as a state legislator, and the emails are presented below. 
State Legislators: 
My name is Joe Wantz, and I am a graduate student at the University of Maryland, College 
Park pursuing my PhD in Political Science.  Specifically, I am interested in American state 
politics and the ways in which states choose to adopt certain policies.  My research depends 
on both a large scale analysis of policy and on firsthand accounts of how policy decisions are 
made. 
 
Your role in the passage of (insert policy) is particularly interesting for my research.  (This 
policy) is one that I will specifically examine in terms of how its adoption was influenced, 
and can have influence, on past and future policy.   
 
I would like to set up a short interview with you to discuss this issue at your convenience, if 
at all possible.  I am very flexible in terms of times and location.  Please let me know if you 





My name is Joe Wantz, and I am a graduate student at the University of Maryland, College 
Park pursuing my PhD in Political Science.  Specifically, I am interested in American state 
politics and the ways in which states choose to adopt certain policies.  My research depends 
on both a large scale analysis of policy and on firsthand accounts of how policy decisions are 
made. 
 
Your organization’s role in the passage of (insert policy) is particularly interesting for my 
research.  (This policy) is one that I will specifically examine in terms of how its adoption 
was influenced, and can have influence, on past and future policy.   
 
I would like to set up a short interview with you to discuss this issue at your convenience, if 
at all possible.  I am very flexible in terms of times and location.  Please let me know if you 




Once the interviewee agreed to speak with me, I sent an outline that provided 
an overview of the interview.  The outline of questions for each group is below. 
State legislators 
1. Could you describe your role in the state legislature? 
2. What areas of policy are of particular interest to you? 
3. How did you get involved in the creation of this policy, and what do you see 




4. Does the existence of a particular policy in other states have any effect on 
whether you would support it? 
a. Would you be more/less likely to support a policy that has been 
adopted by a neighboring state? 
b. Would you be more/less likely to support a policy that has been 
adopted by a state that has a similar partisan or ideological makeup? 
5. This policy exists elsewhere.  Did that have an effect on your decision to 
support it in your state? 
6. Do national politics in general have an effect on policymaking in your state, 
and did it in this case? 
7. How much does growing polarization in Washington effect policymaking at a 




1. Could you describe your role at (organization)? 
2. How important is it for your organization to focus on state policy? 
3. When lobbying state legislatures to support policy, how much of your 
argument depends on the existence of the policy in other states?   
4. Does the partisan makeup of a state impact the likelihood of your organization 
to support policy creation? 
5. Does national partisanship and gridlock create opportunities for state-based 
policy supported by your organization? 
 
The interviews themselves were not quite this structured, as I asked follow-up 
questions and/or explored digressions made by the interviewee.  I was particularly 
interested in their overall thoughts about how partisan polarization affects 
policymaking, as well as about the specifics of policy diffusion.  Obviously, the 
subject of the interview changed the nature of the discussion, as state legislators could 
speak to the inner workings of state politics and interest group staff speaking 
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